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"Organization of the Government for Disarmament" is an attempt to
present a description of the activities of the several departments and
agencies of the United States Government involved in disarmament and
arms control efforts. The paper attempts more than description, however,
by noting a fev of the organizational deficiencies that have accompanied
U.S. disarmament efforts in the past and emphasizing those that, in the
opinion of the writer, have not been adequately corrected in recent
years. One purpose of the paper is to underline both the breadth of the
disarmament organization and the extent of the role of the Department of
Defense in making arms control policy. The disarmament research activi-
ties of the Government are examined in the paper, and It is found that
research has been concentrated excessively on technical problems rather
than political issues.
The study also notes that coordination among the various govern-
mental organizations has been good generally, despite the clumsy
apparatus. Supposedly "good" organization will not result necessarily
in "good" disarmament policy.
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... I oust stress that organization, machinery and
coupe tent people alone cannot guarantee the success of the
mission of our country to prevent war, curb the anas race,
and create lasting conditions of peace. But they can assure
that the best effort of which we are capable is directed
toward these ends.*
Disarmament as a philosophy and as an international political
>ae is the subject of more controversy and discussion today than ever
before. Prior to World War II, disarmament was viewed not only as an
ctteapt to lessen the dangers of war, but also as an economic measure to
reduce the arms burden and devote the benefits gained to economic
progress for all. As military science has evolved in the last fifteen
years, however, disarmament has become linked with the survival of
civilisation, and the need for some form of international arms regula-
tion has become more urgent than ever.
Because of the impact of modem military technology as well as
the international political developments since the war, there has been a
definite shift of emphasis in the philosophy of disarmament. From the
historic concept of disarmament (or arms control) without inspection and
control measures, disarmament efforts have tended to concentrate on
increased international stability as a basis for various systems of arms
control. This transformation in the policy of the government from that
of disarmament in its historic sense was forcefully stated by Secretary
of State Dulles in a radio and television address
t
^From a letter by John J. McCloy to President Kennedy, June 23,
196l, enclosing a araft of a bill "to establish a United States Dis-
armament Agency for World Peace and Security."
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Let ac first of all make clear that we do not of course use
the word "disarmament" in any literal sense. Ho one is thinking
of disarming the United States or the Soviet Union or any other
nation. What we are seeking is action, in the field of arma-
ments, which will reduce the danger of war. It is imperative
that we seek this result.'
Unfortunately, the government's collective position has not
always been this clear, even at the time of the Secretary's statement.
There have oeen occasional unintentional conflicts between our stated
goal of disarmament (in its contemporary sense) and our military policy;
divergencies of opinion Within the government have been illuminated; and
the efforts of the government to organize a disarmament program have
often been either sporadic or half-hearted.
The impression has been gained, rightfully or otherwise, that the
United States favors disarmament in it3 historic concept. Usually,
however, members of the government who have talked of disarmament have
actually been thinking in terms of arms control. Disarmament may be an
ultimate goal in their thinking, but it is tempered by several basic
political pre-conditions. The Soviet government has been uninhibited in
its flat challenge for "general and complete disarmament within four
years." This has been a very attractive argument that appeals to a war-
weary and tension-tried world. It is extremely difficult for the U.S.
Government either to accept or reject this position. Our attempts to
gain the political advantages of the term disarmament while not fully
espousing this position have produced only inconclusive and confusing
results.
2Department of State, Press Release U30, July 22, 1957, p. i.
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What is the significance of this lack of purpose and direction?
Does it mean that the American people— and individual members of the
government— do not have a disarmament philosophy, or have no faith in
any form of disarmament? Or does it mean that there has been no sincere
disarmament effort by the government? It means neither of these.
Essentially, and this is the central theme of this paper, there has been
no concentrated effort within the government to develop a sound disarma-
ment philosophy that would serve as a basis for researchers, policy-
makers, and negotiators. There has been extensive research for disarma-
ment— or arms control—and lots of policy made in recent years, but much
of it on an ad hoc basis designed to meet or counter the latest Soviet
disarmament offensive. As a result, policies have occasionally appeared
negative and designed more for propaganda than negotiation.
Although the volume of information on the general subject of
disarmament is staggering, little effort has been devoted to a study of
the nature of the governmental framework that produces disarmament
policy. It is felt that this is an area that should not be neglected.
Problems in the field of disarmament are not necessarily the same as any
other issue of foreign policy. This was emphasized by Secretary of
State Rusk in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
behalf of the proposed Disarmament Agency:
Disarmament is a unique problem in the field of foreign affairs*
I Know of no other single matter in the international area that
exceeds it in scope and breadth. It entails not only a complex
of political issues, but involves a wealth of technical, scientific,
and military problems which in many respects are outside the
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Department's normal concerns and, in many instances, reach beyond
the operational functions the Department is designed to handle.
3
Disarmament is an emotional issue that is often enveloped in an
aura of utopie on earth; at the same ttlttj disarmament policy is an
integral portion of our national security policy. How the Departments
of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies
within the Executive Branch function in the area of arms control, and
how this activity is inhibited or enhanced by the Congress, deserves
considerable attention. Fundamental goals and objectives must be deter-
mined before effective policy can be formulated. These goals cannot
the product of one man, one agency, or even the product of only one
branch of the government. It is reasonable to question whether past
efforts have been satisfactory, and whether the present course is in the
proper direction.
^United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Disarmament Agency , Hearings on S. 2180, A Bill to Establish a United
States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, 87th Congress,
1st Session, August Url6, l?6l (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1961), p. 15, hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on Disarmament
Agency .
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30ME OF THE PROBLL DISARMAMENT
I. DISARMAMENT: URGENCY AND INERTIA
Ever since disarmament was first seriously considered by an
international body (The Hague Conference of 1699) as a solution for some
of the political and economic problems confronting man, it has been
receiving increased attention from informed and concerned private
citizens as veil as the statesmen of the world. The quantity of human
effort in the form of research, studies, conferences, and diplomacy
seems to be closely correlated to the level of international tension and
proportional to the capability of man to perfect methods with which to
destroy himself. Much of this effort, both private and governmental, is
the product of serious thought and fresh approach to the basic issues of
disarmament. Without doubt, the deluge of literature in recent years
devoted to the discussion of disarmament is sincere and reflects a
genuine concern for the future of civilization. Nevertheless, in the
rush to devise some way out of our present arms dilemma, disarmament has
tended to become a popularized intellectual exercise as well as a
legitimate political objective, and some of the literature that has
dealt with the subject of disarmament has been stimulating intellec-
tually but not too productive of fruitful public debate. It is not
intended that any proposal is too frivolous, too complicated, or too
divorced from what one person might consider reality to warrant serious
consideration. After all, how far are we from reality when we contemplate
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weapons such as the so-called neutron bomb, which—not too facetiously—
might be called the ultimate in the "dirty" weapon?
Despite this recent focus of attention on disarmament, no nation
has indicated any urgent desire to disarm unilaterally. Although uni-
lateral disarmament appeals to some segments of society, it would not
necessarily result in reduced international tension. Voluntary or en-
forced accommodation among conflicting states would most likely be much
more productive. Such accommodation might be realized within an inter-
national political order that is capable of restraining even the major
powers, i.e., a system of "world government," or federation. Despite
the attention this subject has received, and despite the welcome suc-
cesses in the formation of regional organizations in recent years
(primarily in the economic field), there is still no clearly defined
political movement toward a supra-national organization capable of
resolving great power disputes. Until such a system has become a
reality, each nation feels compelled within the limitations of the pres-
ent system to protect and advance its own interests, as it determines
them. Customarily the use of force has been justified in the past as a
legitimate means of settling international disputes when normal politi-
cal and judicial procedures have failed. However, with the a vent of
^According to columnist riarquis Chi Ids, the neutron bomb consists
of ". . . hydrogen fusion set off without the trigger of an atomic
explosion, which Kills all life without causing physical destruction,'
"Fear is the Spur on Test Decision," The Washington Post , July U, 1961,
p. 12. It has not yet been demonstrated that such a weapon can be
developed, although it is occasionally reported that both the United
States and the Soviet Union are working on it.
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3today's weapons, seme of which are almost indescribable in their de-
structive effects, war is being seriously challenged as a rational
political act.
Thus we arrive at what may be considered the fundamental dilemma
of the disarmament problem— the conflict between the effects of modern
military science and the historic concept of national sovereignty, or
the right of a state to use military force to defend itself. The
frightening upward spiral of the destructive capability of the weapons
that are devised seems to call for a major overhaul of the international
political system, if this were possible. Yet, as we add to our arsenals
and threaten each other with nuclear destruction, we are at the same
time confronted with a quantitative strengthening of the only political
institution that possesses the power to employ these weapons, the
sovereign state. It is likely that the increased emphasis on national
sovereignty, or the prerogatives of sovereignty, is detrimental to the
development of an international political system capable of obviating
warfare, or at least confining its destructive effect. Although there
has been a trend toward regionalism, best exemplified by developments in
Western Europe, the emphasis in this trend has been primarily economic
and not as powerful as the growth of nationalism and sovereign integrity.
Sovereignty is inextricably involved with disarmament efforts.
The Soviet Union is inherently opposed to any system of detailed inspec-
tion and control to support a disarmament program as being designed
primarily to subvert her sovereign rights and provide access to her
military secrets for "imperialist spies" in the guise of international
inspectors. On the other hand, the extent to which the United States
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kwould relinquish some measure of sovereignty in support of a comprehen-
sive inspection and control system is justifiably subject to question,
because the United States has not been effectively challenged. Both the
U.S.S.R. and the United States, as well as most other nations, reso-
lutely depend upon extensive armed forces as a protector of their
sovereignty. Despite the urgency of the international situation, in
which more destructive weapons are threatened with increasing regularity,
the sense of urgency has not overcome the inertia of political sover-
eignty.
Some writers feel that the international community has already
passed the "point of no return" for effective disarmament, and that
"Rapid development of nuclear weapons with delivery missiles now makes
adequate control impossible." Whether this is a correct evaluation or
not is not central to the issue at hand; U.S. disarmament efforts will
undoubtedly be continued and increased, despite the fundamental conflict
between the urgency of survival and the inertia of the political state
system.
II. DISARMAMENT OR ARMS CONTROL?
Partly as a result of this clash between urgency and inertia, the
philosophy of arms control has generally replaced that of disarmament in
2Eugene Rabinowitch, "Mew Year's Thoughts," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists
, lUi2, January, 1958. This writer feels that Mr. Rabinowitch
clearly stated the essence of the disarmament dilemma in this brief
article, when he noted that "The politicians had no sense of extreme
urgency. Since 19U5, the development of their ideas has been consist-
ently behind the progress of weapons technology." Mr. Rabinowitch
>1\m tmsd Joa ten ts^sJS bsJi«L eriJ ztmami




<n em* lo vjriqoeoilriq
(3 93**tt& M(4 t>9tl
5the literary, educational, and governmental circles in the United States.
This displacement is far from complete, for there is a body of opinion
in this country (and an even more pronounced group abroad, especially in
western turope) which vehemently rejects the concept of arms control as
a dangerous and irresponsible substitute for the true goal of world
peace through disarmament. The two terms are not mutually exclusive or
necessarily contradictory, however, as they are defined by most of the
advocates of arms control today. It might be beneficial, therefore, to
present briefly a few of the different definitive concepts without any
attempt at detailed discussion, and with an intent to avoid the quick-
sand of the semantic argument over whether armaments themselves are a
cause or symptom of international tension. For the purposes of the
remainder of this paper, however, the terms disarmament and arms control
will be used interchangeably.
Any study of the current concepts of disarmament will quickly
Illuminate a broad spectrum of views, from the historical definition of
disarmament on the one hand, in which armed forces are reduced to that
bare minimum consistent with internal security, to the more sophisti-
cated definitions of anus control on the other hand, some of which pro-
pose even a strengthening of armed forces in various categories in order
to provide a more stable international environment.
continued that "For the time being, there are only two alternatives
lefts disarmament without effective controls, or acceptance of the
state of 'mutual deterrence' as guarantee of peace - until a true world




6The adherents of "general tnd ::>mpIete ,T disarmament are steadfast
in their purpose and quite vocal in their demands. In the Western world,
the disarmament advocates range all the way from the pacifist "ban the
bomb" demonstrators to the more legalistic proponents of complete dis-
armament tied in with a form of world governments . The proliferation
and confusion of disarmament plans proposed in the Western world are not
matched in the Soviet block, however, where the call is for general and
complete disarmament within four years. This is not an innovation of
Premier Khrushchev's; Litvinov was voicing the same challenge thirty
years ago.
The disarmament spectrum includes an indefinite number of varia-
tions of disarmament and arms control proposals. One of these is that
arms control is merely a step leading toward disarmament, and that the
concern of disarmament is:
^Perhaps the most comprehensive and scholarly attempt to link
disarmament with world government is the monumental effort of Grenville
Clark and Leu's Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1958).~ Clark and Sohn present their concept
of a detailed disarmament schedule in Annex I, pp. 203-299, iissen-
tiaily, they call for a preparatory phase of two years in which an
armament census would be taken and the political framework for inter-
national governusnt would be established (including an international
police force), followed by a ten-year disarmament schedule in which each
nation will disarm ten per cent of its forces each year.
**A Litvinov speech in 1933 has a familiar ring today: "Speaking
of disarmament, I permit myself to say here that the failure of the
Geneva coherence has still more strengthened us in the conviction that
the only possible method of disarmament which would be not only effec-
tive but also practical and easily carried out is complete disarmament,
the idea of which we shall continue to put forward at every convenient
opportunity." Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy
,
Volume III , 1933- 19U (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. L3.
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. . . the actual reduction of etr*i and military forces
and its goal, customarily, is the absolute elimination of
all forces. Arms control is the direction of a country's
military policy to reduce the likelihood ana violence of
war. Disarmament may be part of an arms control plan • •*
Other concepts of ara3 control move even further away from the
traditional goal of disarmament. Usually these definitions are ex-
pressed by the proponents of the theory of "stable deterrence,*' and
include some small measure of international control of arms. One view
is that:
The notion of arms control recognizes that suitable
schemes may be devised to reduce fear of surprise attack,
to achieve greater stability, to lessen dangers of war, and
that achievement of these goals may not involve large scale
disarmament either at first or at all. The notion of arms
control is larger than that of disarmament alone.
"
The "stable deterrent" school has many advocates both inside and
outside the government. It li this group that stresses the strong
interrelationship between strategy and weapons systems, indicating that
the latter now determines the former. The primary advantage of stable
deterrence is that unilateral action can safely be taken to approach
this goal, and that theoretically it is desirable for each side to
progress as far as possible toward the possession of a stable deterrent
military posture. Its principle disadvantage, this writer feels, is
-"Arthur T. Hadley, The nation's Safety and Arms Tontrol (New
Yorkt The Viking Press, 19oT), p. 6.
^Amrom H. Katz, "Some Things to Think and Some to Do," Bulletin
°* the Atomic Scientists , I7tlk2, April, l°6l. In a companion piece In
TRe same issue, Frank Bothwell stated in "The Initiative is Ours," p.
126, that "The fundamental problem of arm3 control i3 the achievement
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8that it does nothing to abate the ai.^j race, and is severely limited to
the current situation of what might be '. nuclear bi-polarity.
Stability based upon mutual deterrence, without international inspection
and control, would soon evaporate upon the appearance of a major nuclear
"Nth power," such as Communist China. Ironically, the current trends of
military strategy in tht U.S.A. and the U.S.S.h. leaaing toward a degree
of international stability coincide with estimates that Communist China
will probably possess nuclear weapons in two or three years. Inter-
national instability resulting from the possession of nuclear weapons by
China will far more than offset any lessening of tension resulting from
the more stable weapons systems employed in the future by the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Perhaps the broad :finition of arms control—and thus the
most difficult to employ effectively— is thati
. . . "arms control" (comprises) the entire spectrum of
possible arrangements - from armed "deterrence" schemes, which
may require the building up of certain types of armaments, all
the way to universal disarmament - with the common feature,
however, that these arrangements are adopted as part of a
conscious effort to decrease and eventually minimize the
likelihood of uninhibited armed conflict.'
The difficulty is to determine which of these pegs the United
States Government should hang its disarmament hat on. Should it select
the internationally more popular—yet "idealistic"—goal of complete
disarmament, or reach for something more "realistic" such as a more
stable military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?
^Bernard T. Feld, "Inspection Techniques of Arms Control, in
Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control , Disarmament , and National Security
(Sew Yorki George BrazilierT 1961), pp. 317-318.
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III. FUMDW4E5ITAL POLITICAL GOALS
A brief discussion of the various vUvs of disarmament and arms
control suggests what is felt to be the aost critical weakness of the
organization of the government for disarmament* the determination of
the fundamental political goals that is required before policy can be
formulated. Within certain limitations, governmental agencies are able
to develop disarmament positions for the negotiators to work with; tech-
nical advice on specific issues of military policy, weapons employment,
nuclear test inspection, and other similar data, may be abundantly
available in the various departments, but it would appear that nowhere
is there an established institution or forum or committee whose function
is the discussion and resolution of the basic political issues confront-
ing the United States. Do the American people sincerely want disarma-
ment? If so, is this considered a feasible political goal commensurate
with our security at the present time, in the near future, or as a
distant objective? And under what conditions will we accept the demo-
bilization of our armed forces and the dismantling of the industrial
complex designed to support these forces? Do the American people feel
that disarmament is a realistic objective only after the establishment
of a world order superior to the sovereign state system now in effect?
Is such a world order—or world government—one of the fundamental coals
of the United States? How much risk can our government accept in any
agreement for arms control, when it seems evicient that most Americans
are convinced that "you can't trust the Russians," and "the only thing
they respect is power." If thtj*. are valid interpretations of the
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attitudes of Americans (without oi usstMJ their merit;, is it sound
political policy to state that disarmament is now our number one objec-
tive?
It is also questionable whether our .ovtrrvuent has been organised
properly tc resolve the legal, economic, and political implications of
disarmament. These issues have not been fully presented to the nation.
Does our Constitution—or federal law— require modification in oroer t
permit the establishment of international inspection teams at critical
control points throughout the country? l&at is the capability of our
no-ay to absorb all or a portion of the immense defense- industrial
activities into the non-cefense sector of the economy within the course
of a few years, if disarmament were to become a reality?
These rhetorical cues t ions could be continued indefinitely, of
course. They are indicative of the tremendous political and econoaic,
as well as military, implications of disarmament. At the risk of being
repetitive , it is suggested that these issues, or the product of their
attempted resolution, represent what should be the foundation of United
States disarmament policies and negotiating positions.
The msec to determine and formulate basic goals in this area has
been recognised and clearly defined toy several authorities. One excel-
lent treatment of this issue suggests thats
In this jet-nuclear-miss tie age, nothing strikes a stronger
chord of hope in the heart of man than the ideal of auit i lateral,
effective and foolproof disarmament. Disarmament is a mi
word, but perhaps not a very useful ItffJU It is more realistic
to speak of the limitation and control of arms rather than
"disarmament,** for Ml early elimination of national armaments
down to the level needed only for internal domestic order seems
out of the question. Another point to underscore is that
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armaments are a symptom rather than a cause of international
differences, although it must be granted that growing military
capability can inflame suspicion and distrust among nations.
The assumption of U.S. strategic planners that the Soviet Union
is actively prosecuting a program of iceological and territorial
expansion in which the use of military force is always a pos-
sibility makes it extremely difficult to set in motion negotia-
tions for some degree of disarmament. Military technology and
the complex international political and economic situation make
disarmament at once both more difficult and more desirable than
ever before."
IV. THE TECMJICAL PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL
It is not the purpose here to present a comprehensive picture of
what is generally called the technical problems or difficulties of arms
o
control. There are several publications' that treat this question quite
well) it is the intention rather to relate the problem of the resolution
of technical issues of inspection and control to the decision-making or
policy-making organization of the government.
Essentially, when any technical problem relating to arms control
policy is studied in detail, the following typical question is posed:
"How can the United States be assured of its national security if it
accepts such a system of international inspection and control?" If the
assumption is valid that there is no such thing as a foolproof control
system, then it must be determined how much risk can be accepted in
order to achieve a degree of arms control? No one would claim that the
^Harvard Defense Policy Seminar , 19$7-$8, Volume 1, (Syllabus),
"Disarmament i Alternative to the Arms Race?", p. 32.
^Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (New Yorkt
Columbia University Press, 1958) /although sketchy, is still the
standard non- governmental reference for this subject. Other references
are contained in the Bibliography.
*l » nfl*
mcU ttAJai tioicpi* fi tr»
Lie
km h immmt *i.
K^MUp **** •** *14 ' 'li0
.*arc«vog «!4 tc mil lullgin l




present international situation does not entail risk for the United
States. One nay question how long this present risk or tension level
can be tolerated, but this does not alter the fact that it is tolerated.
Mo system of arms control should be considered beneficial if it would
increase the chance of nuclear war, but perhaps there are programs
acceptable to both disputing sides that would reduce the level or degree
of risk. The art of devising an acceptable disarmament control system
is based upon a comparison of the risk involved in international tension
levels with the risk involved In the proposed disarmament system.
Whether consciously or not, the dec is ion-maker who decides that a
specific system of international control should be proposed or accepted
by the U.S. Government is undertaking a calculation of risk accepta-
bility.
For our purposes, then, the crux of the matter is whether the
government is so structured as to be able to analyze the theory of arms
control risk compared with the present risks of an uncontrolled arms
race, and determine what arms control plan (if any) will best enhance
the security of the United States. There are enough limitations inher-
ent in any governmental dec is ion-making process; li efforts of the
10For a discussion of several of the ramifications of current
military strategy, risk, and deterrence, combined with the "game theory,"
see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1960), especially Chapter 10, "Surprise Attack
and Disarmament, M pp. 230- 2$k.
uIbid., pp. 201-3, "The Imperfect Process of Decision.'
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government should be directed toward maximising the efficacy of the
decision process in the disarmament field.
V. THb JTTH COUNTS
It has been suggested that perhaps the dominant theory of arms
control in the United States is that of stable deterrence." The es-
sence of this theory is that both the Soviet Union and the United States,
under the direction of "rational" political leaders, face each other
with relatively invulnerable nuclear capabilities. In order for this
theory to be effective, both countries oust be aware of the strength of
the other in order to eliminate the value of a pre-emptive, or first
strike, attack. Not only must these forces be secure against attack,
they must also be politically credible in order to deter the forces of
the opposition. There i3 considerable merit to the claim that a "secure
deterrent" lends itself to international stability. One study*2 devel-
ops as its central theme concerning an approach to arms control the
notion that the United States in the past has concentrated too much
effort in developing 'soft" or "first-strike" weapons such as ready
aircraft sitting at the end of runways, and poised missiles in unhard-
ened sites. It is claimed that these weapons offer a tempting target,
not only because of their military attraction to a potential enemy but
because their employment and relative vulnerability indicate first-
strike intentions. The thesis developed from this is that the United
12Hadley, og. £it., pp. 15-20.
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State3 should "harden" these weapons by dispersal, concrete protection,
and other measures, and that these protective precautions will result in
a more stable international climate.
Although this argument is not officially espoused by the Adminis-
tration, it obviously is playing an extensive role in the military
developments in the United States in the early 1960's. Many proponents
of this theory tend to ignore the complications of what is popularly
known as the problem of the Hth country. It is generally recognized
that several nations, in addition to the present nuclear powers, are
capable of developing their own atomic and nuclear weapons. *3 The big
question mark among these nations is, of course, Communist China.
Whether this troubled nation is interested in any form of arms control,
with or without pressure from the Soviet Union, prior to becoming a ma-
jor industrial-nuclear power, is subject to debate. From the U.S. point
of view, a primary concern is the manner in which the problem of dis-
armament and Communist China is approached. Most U.S. efforts so far
have tended officially to ignore the necessity of tying China into any
comprehensive arms control agreement. This i j certainly a vital politi-
cal issue facing the United States, with many implications for foreign
policy; yet, any discussion of Communist China is so charged with emo-
tion that it is questionable whether any governmental change of
organization could facilitate the resolution of this problem. Although
^See W. Davidon, M. Raliestein, and C. Hohenemser, The Nth
Country Problem and Arms Control (Washingtonj National Planning Asso-
ciation, I960), pp. 27-28, In which three groups of potential nuclear
powers are listed.
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the United States Government has dealt with the Chinese Communist regime
without diplomatic recognition, the Chinese would almost certainly state
formal recognition as a pre-condition to joining the disarmament con-
ference table. Satisfactory resolution of this problem is a fundamental
requirement for an effective system of international arms control. It
demands much more governmental attention and public debate.
There are several other facets to this problem of the spread of
nuclear weapons to nations other than the four present nuclear powers.
It has been suggested that the United States could be trapped by Soviet
acceptance of a ban on nuclear tests because:
... an agreement which involved the suspension of nuclear
weapons tests with inspection and which did not include inspec-
tion in Communist China might present an opportunity for
evasions on the part of the Soviet bloc.lh
Ambivalence and vacillation have not characterised U.S. policy
regarding sharing nuclear weapons with its allies. The policy since
World War II has been to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and
nuclear knowledge to non-nuclesr powers. Thi3 policy enjoyed limited
success for several years, but now that Great Britain and France have
developed their own weapons there is increased clamor for limited
sharing of nuclear weapons with U.S. allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). 15
^United States QflUgmtj Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Control and Reduction of Armaments , Final Report of the Subcommittee on
Disarmament, 65th Congress, 2<i Session, Report Mo. 2501 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1558), pp. 5-6. This document is hereafter
cited as Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments Control .
^Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N 1
Country," Foreign Affairs
, 39:355, April, ljol.
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In the development of its policies, any government must strive to
be as objective as possible regarding the motivations and values held by
other nations. Perhaps this U especially true in the field of disarma-
ment. One tendency, for example, is for Americans to equate Russian
obsession for secrecy with an obstinate attempt on their part to antago-
nize the Western powers and impede efforts that might lead to world
peace. Similarly, Americans may be guilty of misunderstanding the
motivations of these "Nth 1' nations in their attempt to become nuclear
powers, and tend to equate their drive for status and prestige with a
reckless pursuit of irrational political objectives!
Each new or prospective nuclear power thinks of the problem as
that of stopping the next country after itself. This i3 the M-pi-
country problem.
As for world stability through arms control, France and England,
for example, have tended to think of their own acquisition of
nuclear weapons as entirely beneficial. Mr. Macmillan has justified
British weapons and V-boabers on the grounds that they permit the
English to exercise influence on arms control arrangements between
the two major nuclear powers. General de Gaulle speaks of the
increased effect on nuclear disarmament which France would have
by becoming a nuclear power. In the limit, one might suppose that
unanimity for nuclear disarmament may be achieved by distributing
bombs to everybody. 1°
It could be a dangerous illusion on the part of the United states
to believe in the rationality, not only of ourselves and our allies, but
also the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to predict the
actions of Premier Khrushchev—or any other political leader of compa-
rable power— If he felt that his chances for a quick victory were
l6ibid., p. 358.
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favorable. This would be especially true if he were encouraged by an
impressive military technological breakthrough or serious domestic cri-
sis.
In the present rather limited discussion of the likelihood of
serious disagreement between Communist China arid the Soviet Union, it is
often stated that the Soviets recognize that they, too, have an Nth
country problem, and refuse to help the Chinese construct nuclear
devices. Certainly this is a plausible thesis, but it could be accepted
too readily by the American people or the government. This is a politi-
cal evaluation that is based upon many factors. The subject calls for
extensive study by the several governmental agencies concerned with the
problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES COlTfHOL?
If the United States Government has made any single disarmament
position clear in the last fifteen years, it should be that this nation
will not accept any disarmament program without "adequate*' provisions
for inspection and control. A demand for international inspection ar
control has been at the heart of nearly all of the U.S. proposals on
disarmament. Not only does the United states insist upon control pro-
visions, it insists also upon the establishment of the inspection and
control system during the early stages of disarmament) either prior to
or concurrent with any disar-*auent steps. It is clear that the govern-
ment prefers the "prior" feature of establishing controls.
Yet, as often as the phrase "inspection and control" is men-
tioned, an observer still might wonder what is meant by "control." Is
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the control feature considered implicit in inspection— a sort of moral
guarantee of good conduct to avoid international censure resulting from
a deliberate and detectable violation? Such a procedure would not be a
control systeu at all. The concept of control in a disarmament scheme
should involve functions beyond that of inspection. The following three
capabilities are considered necessary for an effective control system:
(1) a system oi inspection which has the capability to detect a possible
violation and to communicate immediately with an "International Control
Organ/' or other higher authority; (2) a capability for this higher
authority to interpret and act upon this information; and, (3) an inter-
national police force stronger than any individual member of the system.
The obvious difficulties in obtaining any such system under present
circumstances does not alter the need for the "control 11 requirements
involved.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss substantive issues of
disarmament or propose a new system of inspection and control. The
purpose is to examine government organisation for disarmament, not just
to see what it is but to question its activities and capabilities. It
is important to examine the capability of the U.S. organization to deter-
mine what is meant by "international inspection and control," and to
insure that disarmament policy is properly founded on this concept.
The United States has proposed several general disarmament
schemes in recent years. As mentioned, each one includes inspection and
control provisions in the most broad form. If one of these proposals
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provided— as distinct from inspection— assuming all other functions were
properly executed at the start of the agreement?
MM of the criteria for a control system have been enumerated by
representatives of the government on various occasions. A brief glance
at two references to the problem of control wlxl demonstrate that this
matter has been uncier active consideration, and has been vexing our
policy matters.
In 1959, while discussing the possible situation after disarma-
ment had taken place, Secretary of State Herter commented:
Are we going to come to a point where we are going to develop
some form of international police force of sufficient strength and
subject to a controlled direction on which the nations of the
world can agree, which can be effective in maintaining the peace
for all the world?l7
The manner in which this question was asked indicates that this
problem has not been thoroughly explored and analyzed by the government
agencies concerned.
Less than a month later, the United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, touched upon this matter in somewhat
more detail. After specifying those areas of agreement and disagreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union on disarmament matters,
and after examining the subject of international inspection, Ambassador
Lodge added:
If all nations lay down their arms, there must be institutions
to preserve international peace and security and to promote the
l^Departoent of 3tate, Doctnaents on Disarmament I9k5- 19$9 $
Volume II, Department of State Publication 700ti (Washington: Government
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rule of lav. It seems to the United States Government that there
are three questions in particular to which detailed answers should
be sought
i
1. What type of international police force should be established
to preserve international peace and security?
2. What principles of international law should govern the use
of such a force?
3. What internal security forces, in precise terns, would be
required by the nations of the world if existing armaments are
abolished?™
This is the problem of control, not inspection. Is the United
States Government prepared to sign a disarmament treaty without sub-
stantial agreement on the three questions above? Some of the proposals
would indicate that it is. An examination of the proposal of June 27,
I960, demonstrates that "effective international control" could mean, in
effect, inspection and verification without control. ' The only refer-
ence to a control system, as such, was in item k of Stage Two of the
disarmament proposal, in which:
U. An international police force, within the United Nations,
shall be progressively establishe:- UMt maintained with agreed
personnel strength and armaments sufficient to preserve world
peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved. 20
This appears to be an inadequate treatment of what is considered
a crucial issue. Stating that a police force (or a peace force) shall
be established does not suggest the composition of the force, or even
l8Ibid
., p. Ili96.
^Department of State, Document a on Disarmament I960, Department
of State Publication 7172 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1961), pp. 126-131, hereafter cited as Disarmament Documents , I960.
20Ibid., p. 130.
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aore iuportant, th* nature of its political control and access to
national territories in an emergency.
Perhaps it is felt that these siatttrs are best left unresolved
until after the first stage has been either commenced or completed. In
this event, it is of utmost importance that United States planning should
proceeu vigorously to determine vhat the United States and its allies
will accept as ainimua measures of control. It would be dangerous to
conduct negotiations on the assumption that certain planning is not
required because agreement is not anticipated.
rrav» lifU
CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
The first significant disarmament negotiations in which the
United States was involved as a young Republic were concerned both with
the disarming of existing forces and the limitation of future military
strength. These were the principal features of the renowned Rush-Bagot
Agreement of 1817 regarding the reduction and control of naval strength
on the Great Lakes. Although tested and modified on various occasions,
this agreement has survived and grown in stature for more than a century
and a half. Until the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, "... the Rush-
Bagot Agreement of 1817 was the outstanding achievement to which
advocates of armament limitation could point." * The agreement also
served as the extent of United States disarmament efforts until the
Hague Conference.
The disarmament features debated at the Hague Conference, espe-
cially those dealing with naval forces, drew no effective support. The
competition for foreign markets and the building of colonial empires
precluded any realistic agreement. Although the United States expressed
interest in the subjects of mediation and arbitration discussed at the
conference, there was reluctance in the government to become involved in
what was considered a European affair. In addition, the United States
considered its military forces numerically much weaker than the European
*Herze Tate, The United States and Armaments (Cambridge, Mass.i
Harvard University Press, 191*8), p. 3U.
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2
powers and, thus, not a proper subject lor discussion of limitation.*
Although the fundamental purposes of the conference were not realised,
codes for the conduct of war were formulated. Much more significant,
however, was the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague for the peaceful settleuient of international disputes.
The Second Hague Conference was convened in 1907 at a time of
increased military expenditures and even less confidence among nations
than eight years before. Colonial rivalries and increased discord on
the European continent presented an atmosphere intolerable for success-
ful disarmament negotiations. The arms race which gained additional
impetus after the failure of the Second Hague Conference was climaxed by
the outbreak of the First World War.
After the war, although much effort was expended discussing
international arms limitation, the most productive activity was devoted
to the problem of preventing future German militarism and restricting
naval armaments. France particularly desired elaborate inspection and
control systems imposed upon Germany. Discussion of measures to reduce
arms in general often centered on wrangling over legalistic definitions
of what constituted offensive and defensive arms, and there was little
progress.
In one of his Fourteen Points, President Wilson proposed a reduc-
tion of arms Mto the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." A
similar provision was included as Article 8 of the Covenant of the
^Also, several of the subjects discussed at The Hague Conference
dealt with the possible prohibition of new and "formidable" weapons,
ibid., p. Ul.
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League of -Sationa, which stated that". . . the maintenance of peace
requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point con-
sistent with national safety . . . ." Article 9 created a permanent
Commission to act on these matters in an advisory capacity.
The League was not able to advance materially the cause of dis-
armament because each member viewed disarmament— then as now—from its
own interests. At a special conference in February, 1932:
The Russian proposal for general and immediate disarmament
,
and its alternative proposal for progressive and proportional
reduction, were not accepted. The French proposed an inter-
national police force, which Germany opposed as intended to
maintain the inequalities of the ptace treaties. President
Hoover proposeo reduction by one third, with specific statement
for various categories. The British also had suggestions for
"qualitative" reduction.
3
The same problems existed between the wars as have plagued the
world since 19U5. The differences between the inter-war and post-war
periods are that (1) the international political conflict has bean
intensified by the reduced numbers of principle antagonists, and (2)
modern weapons have increased the feeling of the urgency of disarmament.
Despite our present sense of urgency, however, there has been no more
success In resolving the political problem of security with disarmament
in recent years than in the period between world wars.
There was slightly more progress outside the League of Nations,
in the form of Haval Conferences. There were four major conferences on
the limitation of naval armaments, held at Washington in 1921-1922, at
Geneva U 1927, and in London in 1931 and 1935. The United states was
^Clyde Ea^leton, International Government (Mew York* The Ronald
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very active in these conferences, and uook the initiative in M the
Washington and Geneva Conferences. The United States realized that its
security could be ouch aore readily assured by a limitation of the naval
forces of the principal maritime powers. It was also considered mo3t
important to stabilise the situation in the Pacific. Prom both aspects,
the Washington Conference was at least temporarily a success. ^ a
capital ship ratio for the five major powers was agreed upon, and a
Four-Power Treaty among the United States, Great Britain, France, and
Japan was substituted for the Anglo- Japanese Alliance of 1911.
Although the construction of capital ships had been successfully
limited by the Washington Conference, competition in naval armaments
after that conference shifted to large cruisers. An attempt to extend
the ratio principle to cruisers and smaller ships at the Geneva Confer-
ence of 1927 was a failure. Several reasons for this failure could be
cited: the problem was quite technical (especially from the point of
view of England and the protection of her maritime empire) ; the
**The plan presented to the Conference by Secretary of State
Hughes "... had been carefully formulated on the basis of British
acceptance in principle of naval parity with the United states. Its two
objectives, therefore, were to limit naval competition and to secure for
the United States a navy equal to that of any other power in the world."
Tate, on. clt
., p. 129.
5for a different interpretation, see ibia ., p. lUO. "In consent-
ing in advance to scrap our excess tonnage in capital ships, the United
States relinquished the most effective means of obtaining British con-
sent to parity in all other categories. Likewise, in pledging ourselves
not to add to the existing fortifications on Guam, Tutuila, the Aleu-
tians, and the Philippines, we surrendered our power to act in the Far
East not only to preserve the "Open Door" and the territorial integrity
of China but to protect our own outlying possessions."
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delegations were dominated by "technicians" rather tian politicians;
Great Britain was not willing to accept cruiser parity; and, the fact
that security considerations were not to be discussed at the conference
caused France and Italy to withholu participation.' The Geneva Confer-
ence stands out as an example of a lack of adequate preparation by tlie
United States , as well as a concentration upon the technical issues of
disarmament to the detriment of the political. American and British
views had diverged increasingly since tne Washington Conference, and
only thorough, advanced consideration of the positions of each side
could have offered much hope for success.
After the disappointment of Geneva, the United States commenced a
moderate naval construction program, but at the same time indicated a
willingness to consider further discussion of limitation of naval arma-
ments. A 1928 Angle-French compromise agreement was not acceptable to
the United States. The United States position was that effective action
had to apply to all categories of naval ships, not just the limited
areas of the Anglo-French agreement. Several months of exploratory
diplomacy followed, centered on different theories of naval equality,
gun sizes, and elaborate formulas. The diplomatic preparations leading
up to the London Maval Conference of 1930 were highlighted by the exten-
sive communications between the American and British Governments, with a
personal meeting between Prime Minister McDonald and President Hoover
°[>enjamin H. Williams, The Uoiteu States «*nd Disarmament (Hew
Yorki KcGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931)",' pp. 165-135.
?Tate, op. £it., p. lU2.
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in Washington in October, 1929. fh- jroundworK for the London Confer-
ence was extensive and fruitful.
The American objectives at London were to "assure equality of
naval strength for the United States and -jrreat. Britain,' reach accord
with Japan, and secure reductions in tonnage* 1" The importance attached
to thii conference by President Hoover is demonstrated by the imposing
compos it ion of the delegation, which was headed by Secretary of State
Stimson.
Although the London Conference was not marked by general agree-
ment among the five participants, it die result in greater accord between
Great Britain and the United States. "To (President) Hbover it was
clear that the settlement market* a great step toward disarmament and
9
world peace." The London Conference represented an alleviation of
political issues and avoided the more technical wrangling that had
characterised the Geneva meeting. Added to the peaceful hopes of the
world following the signing of the ariand-Keliogg Pact, the London
Conference roistered international stability, if even for only a very
limited time.
It was not long before international complications clouded the
hopes for a lengthy period of p-ace without an arms race. Japan and
Germany embarkec upon domestic programs to increase their military
strength, and Japan commenced her aggressive actions in Manchuria.








in 192?; she now demanded naval parity with Great Britain and the United
States, a position wholly unacceptable to those two nations.
In the early thirties, the United states actively participated in
the League of nations efforts toward disarmament, especially in the
Conference for the Reduction tad Limitation of Armaments. The most
significant U.S. step at this time was the proposal by President Htoover
to the General Commission of the disarmament conference in June, 1932,
for a one- third reduction in the armies of the world, as well as aboli-
tion of certain types of weapons and the prohibition of aerial bombard-
ment t
But the conference as a whole took no direct action on the
Hoover proposals. It is possible that U they had been sup-
ported by England and France some treaty for the limitation of
armaments would have been signed during the summer, the German
delegation would not have withdrawn from the conference, and
Adolf Hitler aight not have come into power.^
A later Atoerlcan proposal, after the Roosevelt Administration had
taken office, suggested that*
... a system of adequate supervision should be formulated
to insure the effective and faithful carrying out of any measure
of dli -at. Ve are prepared to assist in this formulation
and to participate in this supervision. We are heartily in
sympathy with the idea that aieans 9i -tive, automatic, and
continuous supervision should be found whereby nations will be
able to rest assured that as long as they respect their obliga-
tions with regard to armaments, the corresponding obligations of
their neighbora will be carried out in the same scrupulous
manner. **
There was little support among the European nations for such a
Momentous proposal. International tension was mounting too rapidly to
id., pp. 106-7. H-Ibld., p. 110.
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provide a climate for agreement. For the first tiae, however,, United
States disarmament policy incorporates the principle of inspection and
control.
The final aajor effort to limit armaments before the Second World
War was the London Haval Conf* of 193i>« Japanese insistence that
they he granted full naval parity limited the effectiveness of the con-
ference. There was no attempt to set up a treaty containing quantita-
tive restrictions, a former cornerstone oi American proposals. Instead,
the United states delegation was forced to accept qualitative restric-
tions in the fora of limited battleship tonnage and the future reduction
of the caliber of guns from 16 to lii inches. Japan was not a signatory
to the London Treaty, and would not agree to its provisions even outside
the treaty framework. As Japan pressed her naval construction, Great
Britain, France., and the United States invoked the ""escalator clause"
and commenced their own construction program. The race to World War II
was on.
It is interesting to compare two views of American disarmament
policy in this period between the wars, especially since both views
refer primarily to the first decade of this period, although written
more than fifteen year3 apart. In 1931, it was observed that:
The Unite ? "tates has thus far played a progressive and con-
structive part in matters of armament limitation and this policy
has been strictly in line with our national interests from both
the materialistic and idealistic points of view.J-2
12Wiliiams, og. dt., p. 309.
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After World War II had been concluded and the outline of a new
political and military conflict was beginning to take form, a different
author ce—aatii'l thatt
Sixteen years of attempted limitation of naval araament by the
cor. i ti legislative meth- with tne great naval
powers returning to virtually unrestricted competition. Effort?
in wehaii of naval disarmamunt Ym . ;urity ratios hao
in with the scrapping of capital ships and agreements not to
for t,i. ,. All al aoout limitation
ceased ir Japan' 3 rivals in that year were in a far less
favorable position than they had beta in 19ZI, Neither Great
Britain nor the United States was any longer capable of protecting
by force of arms territory in the western Pacific. Both, therefore,
were to face htwii Hating and catastrophic defeats as a direct
result of the concessions they hau aaat at Washington in 1922.
These evaluations are contradictory, but the contrauiction can
best be explained by the difference in time of the two views. Perhaps
the first is the store reasonable interpretation of two ^liferent aspects
of the same problem. The United States had played a responsible role in
disarmament affairs in the decade i°2i-1931. Usually the A&eiican
negotiators haa come to the conference table with commendable motives,
their position well prepared, and led by senior and able diplomats.
Failure of the conferences to produce international stability in the
late thirtiM coulu a* laia at any of several doorsteps other than the
naval confer disarmament agreements themselves do not necessarily
produce international stability ana reduce tension. The political
resolution of international differences must precede or accompany dis-
armament to make it effective and tad*! ..





UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY -
ITS DEVELOPMENT SIMCE WORLD WAR II
An impressive amount of dramatic literature lias been produced
accenting the "new era usherec la* by tne first explosion of an atomic
device in July, 19U5. Since that milestone in history, atoaic energy
has had its effect on nearly every phase of human endeavor froa anthro-
pology through zoology, and to deny the extent of its imprint on dis-
armament aatters would be absurd. It has acded a new dimension to
modern disarmament negotiations: fear of the impending destruction of
civilization. Yet the importance or significance of the effect of this
new dimension upon the subject of most of the disarmament negotiations
since World War II— the control of atomic energy for military purposes-
should not be overly exaggerated. Despite the terrible consequences
inherent in the newest weapons, the threat of atomic annihilation has
not altered fundamental human relationships or led to a revision of the
international political system. The terror of mutual annihilation has
not driven humanity to new pinnacles of international respect and
accommodation. The basic disarmament problem remains the samet to
strive for a form of control over weapons (or their effects) when each
nation feels— to some degree— that armaments are a basic attribute of
its sovereignty and still fundamental to its security.
Because of the awesome characteristics of atoaic and nuclear
weapons, it was natural that attempts to control armaments since World
War II should concentrate on controlling atoaic energy in some manner.
}8JW*B
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Althoe -entional armaments have often been discussed in disarmament
conferences since l%5, they have been treatea more in the nature of a
bargaining point in order to give the negotiator wore maneuver iu., room.
Package proposals, with emphasis upon limitations on atouie weapons,
have often had unpelatable conditions with respect tc conventional mi
inclu ted bo amlia the entire package unacceptablf .
From the most sweeping proposal of international control and
development of atomic energy, U.S. aisarmai^nt 3ights have gradual
lowered over the last fifteen years to the extent that in 196l efforts
were confined primarily to seeking a tion of testing nuclear
weapons. United States disarmament policy from 19U5 through 1961 re-
flects not only the changing political scene and new technical develop-
ments in military science, but in a small manner reflects also our
governmental organization and effort for disarmament. It is neither an
accident nor entirely a result of the political climate that produced
the most comprehensive United states disarmament activity in 19U6, 1955-
19£7, and 1961.
The United States possessed an atomic bomb in I9h5, but had no
policy .-'inn this new weapon except to use it in the defeat of Japan.
Politically, the government might have been better advi | use the
bomb first to threaten Japan into submission but our horizons at the
time were limited to military applications. Although debate over the
immediate and future uses of atomic energy took place prior to the first
test, it was not until some months after the war was over that the
Unir. ^ites position with regard to control of atomic energy and
MMPMe*^ nj » :••'- astd nWAo »v»4i r^'iaMMM l*r
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weapons was formulated. All possible theories of approaches to the
problem were pfi a during the limited governmental debate: sharing
of atomic information, international control of the production of atomic
energy, and absolute American secrecy and control for as long as pos-
sible. The story of the develop;- ent of our diflarmament policy in these
early post-war months has been veil told elsewhere and does not call for
repetition here. After it had finally been determined that U.S. policy
should be to retain its essential atomic knowledge as an American mo-
nopoly, yet at the same time seek a foolproof system of international
control, a committee under the direction of Dean Acheson was formed at
the Department of State. Shortly after, a group of consultants under the
leadership of Davi Lilienthal were gathered to work with the Acheson
committee to establish the framework of such a policy. The Acheson-
lilienthal Report was then used as the foundation of the Baruch Plan
which was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in
June, 19U6,
The heart of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was international
control of production, and to this was added the Baruch concept of
^This period from 19k5 to 19^7 is graphically presented (as the
"Era oi t ich Plan 1') in Richard J. Sarnet, Who Wants i isarmament ?
(Bos torn Beacon Press, I960), Part I.
pecially recommended are Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar
Megotiations for A ;itrol (Washington; The Brookings Institution,
1961), Chapters III and IV; and Barnet, og. cit., pp. 7-21. A highly
readable historical report is "The Diplomacy "of Disarmament," Inter-
national Conciliation, 526:239- 2)t2, January, I960.
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sanctions by an international force to be used against a violator.
There was to be no major-power veto, of course) and the United States was
to retain its bombs until such time as it unilaterally determined that
the proper international controls had bean established.
Although many high-level policy makers in the U.S. Government
devoted much time and effort to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the
Baruch Plan, there are indications that there was not sufficient thought
devoted to some of the basic political issues involved. Assuming that
our offer to exchange a powerful weapon which only the United States
possessed for future international control of these weapons was as
sincere as it was generous, we should have examined more carefully its
chances of acceptance. Four reasons have been offered, any one of which
could have precluded agreement by the Soviet Union. 3 These reasons are
(1) U.S. retention of the bomb during the implementation of the control
system) (2) international control of any future atomic industry in the
U.S.S.R.j (3) an international inspection system) and (k) the power of
sanctions without great power veto.
Not only had our planners apparently ignored possible Soviet
objections to such a plan which was weighted in our favor by factor (1)
above, but also our entire disarmament concept at this time centered
around developing a "foolproof1 system of controls. Such a concept was
fallacious, even at this time, and tended to result in only the most
detailed systems of international inspection that were anathema to the
Soviet Union. By the time (around the uiid-1950's) we had reoriented our
3Barnet, og. cit
., pp. 1>1J+.
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thinking and had shaken loose of our requirement for an attempted fool-
proof inspection and control system, the numerical progression in stores
of nuclear weapons had rendered even a nominal risk scheme nearly
obsolete.
It also appears that our disarmament planners in this early stage
made little attempt to establish a bargaining position vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. The United States had an atomic weapons monopoly; and as
we rapidly demobilized our conventional forces in 19U5-1QU6, the Rus-
sians soon had a large preponderance of conventional power. Had the
United States commenced its negotiations with proposals to disarm con-
ventional forces to an equally low level with the U.S.S.R., it is
possible that the Soviets would have been more receptive to controls on
atomic energy production. This does not mean that we should have nego-
tiated in "bad faith*— our ultimate goal of international control of
atomic energy need not have changed—but we might have placed ourselves
in a better bargaining position. Whatever hindsight may indicate
fifteen years later, it seems quite likely from an overall review of the
Soviet Union's disarmament policy since World War II that the Soviets
were interested in 19U6 only in United States unilateral disarmament
without controls.
The Baruch Plan served as the basis for American disarmament
policy in the United Nations for nearly nine years. However, except for
the initial 19U6-19U6 phase, disarmament soon became a dead issue as the
cold war heated up and the world's attention became absorbed with events
in Korea. During this quiet period, disarmament issues were handled
c»>i«rt»: »wpri toa
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perfunctorily in the United Wations. Daruch had resigned his position
in early 19u7, and after his departure there was no disarmament nego-
tiator with independent stature and direct access to the President until
the appointment of Mr. Stassen.
Just as our policy grew sterile with inactivity, so did our dis-
armament organisation. Those who had labored over the Acheson-Lil lentha
1
Report and the Baruch Plan dispersed, and the full-time Disarmament
Staff at the Department of State was reduced to a handful of profession-
als.^
It is probable that no more than a handful were required. The
positions of both sides were so in opposition that neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union could maintain interest in disarmament
t
These were the barren years of the negotiations. They were
barren not only because they were dominated by propaganda but
also because they were lacking in new ideas and new approaches
to disarmament. Since neither side felt much incentive to make
any progress on substantive questions of disarmament, the
negotiators spent much of their time on procedural questions
such as what to discuss and when to discuss it. The result was
a series of meetings in which the locale and personalities
changed but tue substance of the talks remained the same."
The United states reluctantly entered into talks with the Soviet
Union on reducing conventional forces, and in 1952 introduced its own
plan for the reduction of conventional forces. This, however, was the
period of the so-called "parallel monologue" in which mutual recrimina-
tion and Justification of positions dominated the United Nations debates
^Bechhoefer, og. cit
., p. 53.
5Infra , Chapter V on the Department of State.
^Bar-net, og. cit., p. 2ii.
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that often seemed endless and tiringly familiar. Although not 30
stated, it was obviously recognised that any fruitful discussions would
have to await the settling of the Korean war.
In the early fifties, three basic developments occurred that
altered the entire disarmament picture; three or four years were re-
quired for these changes to take root and have their full effect, but it
is reasonably safe to say that the disarmament situation had stabilised
by 1957 and has not altered significantly in the remaining four years.
These developments were (1} changes in the political leadership in both
the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with more importance attached to the latter;
(2) the political settlement of the Korean war; and, (3) the development
of the hydrogen bomb by both the Soviet Union and the United states. Ho
one of these three factors standing alone is of enough importance to be
considered crucial but taken together with their immediate consequences
they represent an entirely new disarmament situation.
The conclusion of the military operations in Korea, which had
been successfully limited both in geography and use of weapons, com-
bined with a more aggressive yet more subtle and flexible leadership in
the Kremlin, resulted in a renewed Soviet disarmament emphasis. The
tactic of the Soviet disarmament offensive was to combine threats of
destruction with appeals to reasonableness in order to ensure a peace-
ful, disarmed world. The advent of nuclear weapons and their tremendous
de tractive capacity provided the appropriate tool for Khrushchev. He
now had, supposedly, a military "equalizer" that could place him on the
same power footing with the West, and in the same instrument a weapon of
almost unknown destructive quality that called for disarmament efforts
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of unprecedented magnitude. The Soviet approach to disarmament, al-
though at least a quarter century old, was perfectly tailored to the
imperative of the hydrogen boob: the only effective control of such a
monstrous weapon was complete disarmament, now .
By 195k the United States had dropped the Baruch Plan as its
basis for negotiation. At the same time, military policy underwent a
major reorientation as the "New Look"--decided upon in 1953—was im-
plemented. Gradually, atomic weapons began to be integrated into the
military forces in great numbers; "massive retaliation" became an over-
worked symbol} and a prep-j^-crant reliance on strategic air power,
similar to the pre- Korean U.S. military posture, came into being. At
about the same time, it was recognized by many on both sides that the
opportunity for effective control had either been lost or was fast
fading.
It is with this situation as a backdrop that the government under
President Eisenhower's direction undertook the most momentous disarma-
ment effort to date. Harold Stassen was appointed Special Assistant to
the President for Disarmament. Under his direction, an enlarged staff
was assembled, and extensive studies were commenced. Yet, despite the
scope of this activity, there appeared to be a fundamental contradiction,
similar to some of the political problems discussed in Chapter I, inher-
ent in the national security policy of this perlodj
. . . despite the fact that U.S. policy was strongly rooted
in nuclear defense, and complete atomic disarmament seemed
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hopelessly impractical, the Administration supported precisely
such a proposal in the United Nations.?
The United States had not fitted its disarmament policy into the
framework of national security and foreign policy. This serves to
emphasize a lack of attention to the determination of basic political
objectives.
As has been pointed out by one specialist, the U.S. decision to
support the Anglo-French proposals of June 195U was a major shift in
o
American disarmament policy. General disarmament was now accepted for
the first time as the primary objective of the plan; the Baruch-Acheson-
Lilienthal concept of international ownership of atomic energy produc-
tion had been abanuonedj and, reliance on the development of a "fool-
proof" control system had been shelved as patently impossible. Although
this offer of controlled disarmament by stages was quickly rejected by
the U.S.S.R., it still influenced western disarmament positions for the
next several years. The United States, henceforth, adopted "general
disarmament'' 83 its fundamental goal in nearly all arms talks, although
one writer suggests that the primary motivation in 1953 wa3 "psychologi-
cal warfare. "^
Still, the 195U proposals were a milestone that led to the
closest approach, three years later, to a disarmament agreement between
the Soviets and the western powers:
'Barnet, op. cit
., p. 32.
£Ibid., pp. 30-31. 9Ibld., p. 33.
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Of all the many proposals and counter-proposals now filling
the waste-paper baskets of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the
Anglo-French Plan was undoubtedly the fairest and best-balanced
attempt to ensure that disarmament and security proceeded hand
in hand. In sum, the We3t was saying for the first time to the
Soviet Union, "We will ban the bomb if you will accept proper
control plus parity in ordinary armaments and armed forces."*
There was a tortuous path in American aisarmament policy to be
followed, however, before the mid- 1957 near agreement could be reached.
Although the Soviets had initially rejected the 195U plan, they later
indicated interest in the nature of the scheme and on May 10, 1955, the
U.S.S.R. proposed a program quite similar in stages to the western offer
of the previous year. Thfc force levels proposed by the Soviet Union
were essentially the same as In the western proposal and the programmed
stages were similar, although the Soviet plan was typically circumspect
about the details of inspection and control.
Whether accidental or otherwise, the Soviet timing for this
proposal was embarrassing to the United States. President Eisenhower
had just appointed Mr. Stassen to his cabinet- level position in the
Administration; and the United States, obviously not prepared to discuss
the plan (although it was quite similar to one the United States had
just endorsed), requested a recess of the Disarmament Subcommittee.
This delay was ostensibly to prepare for the approaching Summit Confer-
ence, but actually
. . . the Administration seems not to have considered the
implications of the proposals to which it had been willing to
lend its name. Critical examination of disarmament policy did
not seem particularly urgent, since the likelihood of Russian
^Anthony Nutting, Di sarmament ! An Outline of the Negotiations
(New Yorit: Oxford University Pre3s, 19^91, P« 11 •
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uacquiescence appeared remote. Disarmament had therefore been
given a low priority in the formulation of foreign policy.
^
At the Summit., President Eisenhower introduced his 'open skies' 1
proposal, which, similar to the atoms- for-peace plan of 1953 , was
neither an arms control nor a disarmament measure except in the most
broad sense. They were, in effect, "confidence building" exercises or
first steps toward anticipated comprehensive arms control programs.
They were the first indications of the new philosophy of arms control
that was to become current toward the end of the decade. President
Eisenhower's offer to exchange military blueprints and arrange recipro-
cal aerial reconnaissance was also the start of a trend to shift the
locale for disarmament negotiations from a broad scale at the United
Nations to more restricted bodies, both inside and outside the UnK
Mat ions
.
At the resumption of the meeting of the subcommittee of the
United Nations Disarmament Commission at the end of August, the U.5.S.R.
requested clarification of certain point3 relevant to force levels,
prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, and discontinuance of tests.
The United States representative, Mr. Stassen, at this time placed a
".
. . reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions
. .
." thus wiping the slate clean for new U.S. proposals, with or
without embodying previous features. The stated reason for this move
was the worsening problem of establishing satisfactory inspection for
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opening for scoring a propaganda victory. This reservation appeared not
only to split the United States from the British and French positions,
but it also appeared as an American withdrawal as a result of Soviet
acceptance of certain positions.
Although the exercise of the reservation may have been a logical
move, it was a political error. After having committed itself to the
principle of "complete prohibition ana elimination of nuclear weapons,"
ana having worked so assiduously to secure Soviet acceptance of this
point, the U.S. reservation of positions so soon after Soviet concur-
rence reflected poor preparation of negotiating positions. It appeared
that i
. . . the Soviet admission that nuclear stocks could be
concealed in violation of a treaty was used by the United
States to justify its abandonment of the idea of complete
nuclear disarmament. 13
The havoc created by this reservation has been succinctly de-
scribed by one authority
j
l2Bechhoefer, op. cit., pp. 312-315* Mr. Bechhoefer attributes
this development to the shift in emphasis from "comprehensive disarma-
ment" to "partial measures." "The two main differences between the
evolution of the Russian position and that of the West were.
1. The Russians moved faster and were ready with their program
of partial measures a year before the Vest.
2. The faiest at this period forgot one of the fundamentals of
all negotiations with the Soviet Union: that the Western proposals not
only must be technically sound but must be politically attractive, since
the Soviet Union will invariably interrupt any negotiation, however
serious, to secure a propaganda advantage. The United states reserva-
tion of positions gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to reap such an
advantage."
^Barnet, og. cTt., p. 38.
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Although neither the British nor the French Government went
as far as the United States, it was all too clear in the autumn
session of the Subcommittee that the American reservation had
dau whole Western position, exposed the West to charges
of backsliding, and handed the initiative to the Soviets.**-
The net result of the American reservation was to start the minuet
all over again, although not quite fro.u the beginning. For the remainder
of 1955 and through most of 1956, the Soviet and Western delegates ex-
amined in succession several specific issue.;, gradually moving further
sway from the concept of comprehensive ament. By 1957 all t
nuclear powers had clearly recognised the i>opos3ibility of truly effec-
tive inspection because cf the ext nt of previous nuclear production,
and so the negotiations became centered on issues other than nuclear
disarmament. Arsis control had arrived as a legitimate philosophy.
Although there were serious and encouraging negotiations on
specific issues with the Soviets through 1956 and into 1957, l -*
There was still no agreement, however, on where the elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons would fit into the complex disarmament
framework now emerging from the negotiations.^
The re-evaluation of the American position continued during and
despite the negotiations still being conducted at the Disarmament
Commission Subcommittee. The need for such an examination had been
suggested on December 5, 1955> to the General Asfembly by Ambassador
Lodges
^Nutting, og. cit ., p. 19.
-met, og. cit
. , pp. liO-Ul. Some of the subjects of dis-
cussion were zones for aerial inspection, control of delivery vehicles,














An intensive review of the inspection problem (was required)
$
and soiae new and radical conception which would offer the world
time, security, and confidence while it tackled the problem.
As has been noted, Governor Stassen, after his harch, 1955, ap-
point^ent, assembled a staff to conduct such a review and a new appraisal
of U. .. dsarmament policy. This was the
. . . beginning of a new pragmatic approach in shaping U. .
arms control policy. The nuclear age with its great advances in
military technology in but a very brief tine, had wade the sea.
for absolute solutions impossible. 10
A set of principles was formulated in 1955 to serve as a guide
for U. >. policy. ' The?- ~r!nciples centered around inspection ana
control, as did the United States proposals in London in Harch, 1956.
It was not until November of 1956, however, that the United States
reached its ms on new proposals, and these were spelled out
before the General Assembly on March 19, 1957, by Ambassador Lodge.
^Department of State, Disarmament : The Intensified Effort
,
1955- 1956 (Washington! Government Printing Oflice, 1958), p. 21.
i8Ibid., p. 10.
19lb id., p. 13, for this list of principles.
20Ibid., pp. 3>3U. Ambassador Lodge listed the following objec-
tives for the negotiations:
"1. To reverse the trend toward larger stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and to reduce the future nuclear threat.
2. To provide against great surprise attack and thus reduce
the danger of major war.
3* To lessen the burden of armaments ana to make possible
improved standards of living.
L. To ensure that research and development activities concerning
the propulsion of objects through outer space be devoted exclusively to
sciencnic and peaceful purposes.
$« To ease tensions and to facilitate settlement of difficult
political issues . . . ."
Although there was reference to a reduction of the "burden of
armaments,' generally this policy statement concerned specific segments
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Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers in discussions over
the next few week3 effectively abandoned previous approaches to general
disarmament—although this was usually noted as a fundamental goal—
and instead searched for partial measures that appeared to have more
promise. The positions of both sides moved considerably closer to each
other throughout the late spring, and many participants and observers on
both sides were quite optimistic. Although this optimism was, unfor-
tunately, not Justified by later events, it seems a little strange in
retrospect why it was so strong at the time. Although the Soviets had
shifted—as had the West-' to partial measures in place of general dis-
armament and had moved toward the West's position on other points, there
was still the same generality and ambiguity regarding control systems,
to cite the primary obstacle. When discussing stages of international
control in the reduction of conventional forces in their proposals of
April 30, 1957, the Soviet delegates talked in terms of "appropriate
international control," and added that:
• . . the functions of control will include the collection ana
analysis of information provided by States on their implementation
of partial disarmament measures. Those functions should be per-
formed, as agreed by the parties, by a control organ established
for the purpose under the Security Council.
of the disarmament problem that could be considered the most likely
subjects for negotiations.
The report then remarked that "None of these proposals was
dramatically new in substance. Earlier sessions of the Subcommittee
had labored over similar versions. . . . But . . . there were signs
that a genuine negotiation might develop . . . •"
21Department of State, Documents on Disarmament , 19^5- 1959 ,
Volume II, 1957- 1959 , Department of State Publication 707o^WashTngton:
Government "printing Office, I960), p. 7&2.
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Also included in these proposals were the usual requirements of
renunciation of atonic and hydrogen weapons and the removal of military
bases from foreign soil. Nevertheless, the proposals represented a
significant advance on the Soviet part and provided an adequate basis
for serious negotiations. They also served to spotlight any Western
response.
Of primary interest to the subject of this paper is what developed
in the next two months within the U.S. Government. There can be no
final or detailed determination of this matter, of course, because of the
intricate and hazy process by which U.S. disarmament policy has been
made, the personalities of the leading disarmament figures, and the
unavailability of detailed documentary information as to the individual
and departmental positions taKen at the time. Whether one is inclined
to support or disagree with U.S. disarmament policy in mid- 1957, it can
hardly be claimed that responsible governmental organization was condu-
cive to the formation of the most effective and advantageous policy.
22See Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and peace
(Clevelandj World Publishing Company, I960), p. 20*?7 IrTwhich the late
former Commissioner describes the procedure for formulating nuclear
policy is made} "When we come right down to it, it is not easy to say
precisely who makes atomic energy policy in the United States or how
it is made. If one were to try to trace the caaking of a basic nuclear
policy decision, he would have to go through a tortuous maze of govern-
mental agencies that initiate or suggest policies, draft position papers
on proposed policies, advise, dilute, compromise, and modify policy
proposals. He would probably get lost or give up before he had com-
pleted his quest through the State Department, the Department of Defense,
the Joint Committee, the National Security Council, the Operations
Coordinating Board, the President's special staff assistants on scien-
tific affairs, disarmament, and other matters, and the Atomic Energy
Commission itself."
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The crucial issue from the organizational point of view was the rela-
tionship of Harold Stassen and his disarmament assistants to the rest of
the Executive Branch, specifically the President and the Secretaries of
State and Defense, as well as the Chairman of the A£C. In any organiza-
tion there will be both structural and personal relationships, and the
strengths of one can seldom fully overcome the defects of the other}
usually the defects of either will aggravate the weaknesses of the other.
No wholly satisfactory organization for disarmament can be found, but
perhaps the framework in existence in early 1957 was as good as any that
could be devised, and certainly better than pre-1957 organization.
Yet, personal and official relations somehow were not productively
established. A participant in official disarmament negotiations has
noted thats
The separation of Stassen and his staff from the governmental
agencies responsible for the development of United States policy
in this field, created an administrative pattern readily leading to
conflict and confusion within the government. Unfortunately,
Stassen 1 s personal relationships with the policy-making agen-
cies—the State Department, Defense Department, and Atomic
Energy Commiss ion—were never sufficiently close to overcome
this administrative handicap. 23
One observer would have had the disarmament failure in 1957
charged to the Pentagon and the AEC as a result of ". . . the most
violent internal administration battle yet over the disarmament talks."^
-^Bechhoefer, 0£. cit ., p. U36.
^Walter Lippmann, "The Disarmament Issue," The Washington Post
,
July 2, 1957, p. 15. Regarding the governmental consensus for the
disarmament policy it was following, Lippmann commented that "...
the President and his administration have a policy to which some are
opposed, and about which the rest are not convinced."
--:-• f.-i
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This is a staple explanation that hardly does justice to the complexity
of the negotiations or the issues, not only with the Soviet Union but
also with our allies and within the government itself. It is this last
aspect of disarmament policy formulation that has often been regrettable
for slowness and confusion in the past.
Another critic of the U.S. organizational efforts at this time
observed that:
In the case of disarmament it has now transpired that he
(Eisenhower) started the diplomatic exchanges with no real agree-
aent within his own official family, with no adequate under---
standing with our allies, and with his own mind still fluid.
^
There had been delays by the Western Powers in the negotiations
so that there could be consultation with home governments and the MATO
nations, and undoubtedly there had been some backstepping by the Allies
on occasional issues. Regrettable as these irritants were, however, it
is this writer's opinion that by themselves these problems did not cause
the eventual rupture of negotiations at the end of August, 1957. There
are areas of valid criticism of Western policy and procedure, but to
place the blame for failure solely upon the Allies is not reasonable.
It seems clear that, even in mid- 1957, there would still have to oe
major concessions by both sides in order to reach agreement. The dis-
armament issues that required concessions were (1) the nature of an
inspection system; (2) the question of prohibition of atomic weapons;
and (3) the timing of the stages of reduction of conventional armaments.
Chalmers K. Roberts, writing in The Washington Post , June 2,
1957, claimed that "Time and again Stassen fought the Pentagon and the
A£C for approval of specific ideas to carry it /D.3. disarmament policy^
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Although these were Important issues, the United States should have been
just as concerned with (1) international agreement on control of CBR
weapons) (2) the question of Communist China; and (3) the problem of
26implementing control concurrently with an inspection system. °
DtmftfMMUnt efforts since 1957 havt been concentrated on attempts
to write a treaty to ban nuclear tests. The basic goal of general and
complete disarmament is still professed;, especially by the Soviet Union,
but there has been little serious attempt at comprehensive disarmament,
despite a flurry of proposals at the United Nations General Assembly in
27
the fall of 1959 and in the following spring. Other than the brief
and unproductive preliminary discussions of methods to prevent surprise
attack which took place in the fall of 1956, the emphasis has been
placed on discussions to establish a workable system for the monitoring
and control of nuclear tests.
The United States apparently entered into the negotiations on a
nuclear test ban with considerable reluctance, and not a very well pre-
pared position. As Mr. Bechhoefer has stated, it meant that President
out." Roberts stated that the U.S. proposals were "essentially accepted"
by the Soviet's counterproposal of April 30, but this writer would not
agree with that interpretation for reasons previously stated.
26
:ee Chapter I, "After Disarmament, What" for a brief discussion
of this problem. Philip Moei-Baker, The Arms Race (New York: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 195*0, P» 232, mentioned this vital political Issue.
"In 1955 they ^the United States Government/ had dropped the UH Plan;
they had accepted Inspection, in principle^ instead. But no one had
even suggested any system by which control by simple Inspection could be
made to work."
2?Sei. Disarmament Documents , V. II, Documents Nos. 376, 378, and
393 J Disarmament Documents, 196QTppT &T, 100, and 126.
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26
Eisenhower had to "untie the August 29 package." It also required a
new forum for the negotiations since the -.ovists would have no more to
do with the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, and had refused to
accept a Commission broadened from eleven to twenty- five members.
In early 195& there was an exchange of views between the U.S.S.R.
and the United states regarding the convening of technical conferences.
In July, the technical meeting on cessation of nuclear tests got under
way, followed in November by the conference of experts to study the pre-
vention of surprise attack. The latter conference lasted less than six
weeks, but the conference of experts on nuclear test ban produced an
agreement that was to serve as the basis of the marathon negotiations
that have stretched (as of the summer of l°6l) over nearly three years.
These negotiations have been called <*. . .by all odds the most impor-
tant developments in the field of arms control since World War II. "29
Before examining the United States role in the test ban negotia-
30
tions, the conference on surprise attack should be mentioned briefly.
This conference served to emphasize two failings in U.S. disarmament
preparation} (1) the reluctance, or failure, to commence extensive
research sufficiently in advance of the negotiations, develop a corps of
negotiators, and formulate basic positions prior to a conference; and
2
*Bechhoefer, og. clt
. , p. hhS'
29Ibld., p. U57.
* See Department of State, Official Report of the United States•tm i s 'jli i i n u
Conference of Experts Tor the^tudy
"
"o? PossiBle
iht blTHe lpfTTX in Preventing SurpriseTttack and
the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Governments (Washington; i
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(2) the concentration on technical issues to the neglect of the politi-
cal issues. The conference on the prevention of surprise attack was a
model of thorough preparation of the technical problems (despite the
lack of time) as viewed through American eyes with a strange disregard
of the basic political obstacles that were likely to delay agreement.-**
The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the U.S. posi-
tion are oi importances
Over the years the United States could frequently be accused
of failure to attach proper importance to arms control negotia-
tions ana failure to give the representatives the administrative
and financial support required for a meaningful negotiation.
For this conference the administrative and financial arrangements
of the United States were more than ample. The United States
allegation consisted of fifty experts and advisers. It incluti
eminent scientists such as Dr. G. B. Kistiakowsky ana Dr. J. B.
Viesner and high ranking military officers such as General 0. P.
Wayland of the United States Air Force and Hear Admiral P. L.
Dudley of the United States Havy. The chief of th* ation,
William C. Foster , had an outstanding record both in business and
the United states Government, with no previous exposure to the
subject of cisarmament. Furthermore, he was appointed to the
position less than thirty days prior to the convening of the
meeting. The senior political adviser, an experienced Foreign
Service Officer, Julius Holmes, had served ten weeks in London
In the summer of 1957 as a deputy to Governor Stassen. The only
other members of the delegation with substantial previous ex-
perience in the field of arms control negotiations were three
capable assistants who played a relatively minor role in the
decisions of the delegation."
31ln testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, the
head of the delegation, Mr. William C. Foster, stated that "We were much
Impressed by the importance which Soviet representatives attached to
secrecy as a military asset, B as quoted in Bechhoefer, og. cit ., p. ijok.
It should have been obvious previous to this that the Soviet Union would
certainly not consider a detailed inspection 3y^tem without corres-
ponding disarmament steps because of the marked advantage this would
give the West in penetrating Soviet secrecy.
^^tiechhoefer , oj). cit.
, pp. 1*66-1*69.
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Developments since this conference indicate that the government
has profited from the experience. Organization has improved, additional
basic research has been implemented on a more continuing basis, and a
body of experts in the executive agencies has gradually come into exist-
ence. However, there was to be at least one more embarrassing reversal
for U.S. disarmament efforts in the winter 19#M959.
The story of the progress of the "Conference on the Discontinu-
ance of Nuclear Weapons Tests" has been told with detail and clarity in
several publications.^ These negotiations constitute the most serious
and productive— as well as most lengthy—disarmament negotiations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United states. They also demonstrate the
extent to which arms control goals have been lowered since World War II,
in an attempt to reach an agreement that would "build confidence" as
well as establish some degree of arms control.
aarly meetings between the U.K., the U.i.S.R., and the U.S.A. in
November and December followed a familiar pattern. The United States
and Great Britain presented their views,
^specially recommended are the following three: (1) United
States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign delations, Conference on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests t Analysis of Progress and"
Posit loas of the Participating Parties'^ JcCobai 1936-August i960 "» Keport
of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, 86th Congress, 2d Session, Cctober
1960 (Washington: Government Printing Offlea, I960), hereafter cited







*Nuc lear Weapons icsts, Department of "slate PuEil-
caTiorf 7090 (Washington? Government Printing Office, I960), hereafter
cited as Geneva Conference 195>6- 60{ (3) Bechhotfer, 0£. cit ., Chapter
XIX, "The Nuclear Test Cessation~£onference s .
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maintaining that any agreement on the discontinuance
of nuclear tests oust also contain the details of an inter-
national system of control and an obligation to establish such
a 3ysteia . . . ,-^u
and the Soviet Union "maintained that, before controls were discussed,
the Conference must reach agreement on a permanent cessation of tests. "^5
Eventually, a moratorium on tests was announced by the negotiat-
ing States for various periods of time, and later disagreement between
the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and the United States centered around the
composition, functions, and powers of the control organ.
From the aspect of the effect that government organization has on
policy, the most significant development was in the area of technical
support. The United States was ably represented by technical as well as
political experts, most of them with previous valuable experience in
disarmament negotiations. However, the United States proceeded to the
Geneva negotiations with insufficient (as it developed) scientific in-
formation regarding the ability we had to detect underground explosions
and identify them as non- earthquakes. This information, which was based
upon a test (Ranier) that was not originally intended as an experiment
in underground detection, was presented soon after the conference com-
menced. Tests in the fall of 1958— specifically designed for this
purpose
—
produced much less optimistic datas
The data, when thoroughly analyzed, led to two conclusions:
(1) The method of distinguishing earthquakes from explosions by
the direction of the earth's movement, as reported on seismo-
graphs, is less effective than previously estimated; and (2)
3 *
*Geneva Conference , 1958-1960, p. 2.
35ibid., p. 2.
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the number of earthquakes per year equivalent to a nuclear
explosion of a given yield is about double that previously
estimated.-
This nev data, presented to the conference on January 3>> 19S°> created
consternation among the Soviet delegation, which "... refused to con-
sider the data and claimed that it was submitted soi,:iy to place an
obstacle in the way of agreement. " J For some time the conference failed
to move, until an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower
and Premier Khrushchev broke up the technical jam.
There has been, of course, much criticism of the efforts to enter
into these negotiations before having developed a solid position, es-
pecially on the technical issues. The combination of lack of preparation
for the political problems that arose at the conference on prevention of
surprise attack, and lack of preparation of technical issues at the test
ban conference have accented the apparent need for the government to be
conducting extensive and continuing basic research on as many areas of
promise as possible.
The Hardtack II tests emphasized the requirement for an extensive
study of nuclear test detection. Accordingly,
... at the request of the Department of State, the President's
Special Assistant for Science and Technology had, on Daqwhtf 28,
I9$b, appointed a panel on Seismic Improvement, under the chair-
manship of Lloyd Berkner, president of Associated Universities,
Inc., to review in the light of this new seismic data the feas.
bility of improving the detection system recommended at the 1956
technical conference. This panel reported its findings on
[bid,, p. I
37£bic., p. 10.
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March 16, 1959. Subseemntly the panel also submitted a 1
tailed report, entitled "The Meed for Fundamental Kesearch in
saolocy„"3°
This was the birth of Project Vela, which is the principle sub-
ject of discussion in Chapter VIZ, Anas Control and research.
The controversy within the U.i. Government on the question of
nuclear tests has also been thoroughly uis:usj«d in several books and
periodicals. The problem of the publication of the views of individual
officials that are in agreement with the government is not confined to
disarmament satters, and really need not be discussec in a paper sealing
with organization. The President is the ^head of his family," and there
should be no significant problem of divergent opinion that could not be
readily resolvt
A footnote to tne postwar disarmament story has oean prov by
the negotiations on general disarmament in 1959-1960. The story of the
negotiations themselves in the Ten-Power Disanaaraent Committee is a
familiar one.^' In the Ten-Power Coou&ittee, the Soviet Union had
finally gained its long sought position of parity with the West, mostly
as a result of its attack on the structure of the Disarmament Subcom-
mittee of the United nations, in which the Soviets were the sole
representatives of the Communist bloc. Proposals on both general dis-
armament and partial measures were sprinkled throughout the eight raonths
from the convening of the General Asseiabiy 01 the United Nations
388echhoefer, oj>. cit., p. 509
J
'For sn excellent historical and analytical presentation of
these negotiations, see ibid ., Chapter XX, 'The General Disarmament
negotiations."
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in September, 1959, to the breakup of the Ten-Power Disarmament Sub-
committee in June I960 by the walkout of the Communist members. Some
tactical ground was surrendered by both sides during the negotiations,
but the same basic difficulties on the degree of inspection and control
and international authority divided the two camps.
The organization for disarmament has suffered heavy criticism for
its efforts during this period. In the late fall and early winter 1959-
1960, a group of consultants and specialists under Charles A. Coolidge
was summoned by President Eisenhower and charged with the task of once
again reviewing America's disarmament policies. The report of the
Coolidge Committee has not been made public, but it was reported to be
too sketchy to serve as a basis for establishing policy for negotiations.
Fundamentally, the Coolidge Committee recommendations were
for further armaments rather than disarmament. The report
apparently opposed any cutback either in conventional or nuclear
weapons or any agreement to ban underground nuclear testing
without regard to safeguards. It is true that a strong defense
position cannot only be consistent with arms control but also
can facilitate arms control. However, the Coolidge report, as
far as is known, made no attempt to develop arms control pro-
posals in harmony with a strong defense posture. The report
again demonstrated that even an individual of ability and good
will cannot^ in a period of sixty or ninety days, master the
subject of international arms control sufficiently to produce
any significant contribution.*40
Because the Coolidge report was not employed as the sole basis
for the U.S. position at the Ten- Power Disarmament Committee, the
delegation under the leadership of Frederick Eaton*1* had to develop its
k°Ibid., p. 533.
k*An outstanding negotiator, although he had had ". . . little
experience in diplomatic negotiations and no experience in the field of
arms control . . ." Ibid., p. 5.
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ovn position and at the same time attempt to work in concert with our
Western allies. Again, the United States was in the position of being
represented by very able persons who were handicapped by lack of suf-
ficient tia. and a basic disarmament program upon which to build nego-
tiations.
The United States position was finally unveiled by Secretary of
State Hertert
... we have two major goals in the forthcoming negotiations.
Urgently , to try to create a more stable military environ-
ment, which will curtail the risk of war and permit reductions in
national armed forces and armaments.
Subsequently , to cut national armed forces and armaments
further, and to build up international peace- keeping machinery,
to the point where aggress *->n will be deterred by international
rather than national force.
These two goals are equally important . . • .^
The first goal of a "more stable military environment" included
such objectives as reduced danger of surprise attack, controls against
the spread of nuclear weapons, etc. The United States position still
rested on arms control prior to the reduction of military forces. >ince
the Soviets had not shifted their fundamental views regarding controls
and their relation to the stages of disarmament, there could be little
mama of agreement. Even though the Soviet delegate placed before the
Committee rather detailed proposals of inspection and control (including
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chemical, and biological weapons" ) the United States was not in a
position to respond constructively.
A review of the United states participation in disarmament nego-
tiations since 1915 indicates that to a certain extent, policies have
fluctuated without the advantage or sophistication of flexibility; yet,
at the same time, these policies have often been rather inflexible with-
out necessarily being based upon firm, fundamental decisions closely
related to national goals. More simply stated, U.S. policy was one of
vacillation without flexibility and rigidity without principle. Several
causes for this situation can be singled out for emphasis, but in the
area of government organization rather than substantive issue criticism
centers on the problem of the lack of ability to relate various dis-
armament philosophies to national policy. Hot all the vagaries of
disarmament of the past sixteen years have been caused by poor organiza-
tion, by any means, but it is clear that govern.aeat organization has not
facilitated more effective formulation of policy.
k3ibid.
, p. 109.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FRAM£WORK OF DISJUWAJfglfT ORGANIZATION
Recently it has become more generally recognized that disarmament
policy is an integral part of our national security policy and our for-
eign policy. This awareness of a nore functional role for disarmament
policy coincides with, or overlaps to a considerable extent, the change
in the philosophy of disarmament since World War II, which places in-
creased eaphasi3 upon arms stabilization measures rather than reduction
of armament levels as an immediate goal of disarmament. It is a reflec-
tion of the trend away from the principal historic goal of disarmament,
with its focus of attention upon the economic benefits that would accrue,
toward the immediate and fundamental issue of the survival of man.
Military technology has progressed to such a level of destructive
capability that an entirely new philosophy of arms control has developed
in the United States in recent years. To many, disarmament is no longer
merely a "good thing" that might produce additional funds for other
sectors of the economy— it is now one of the objectives fundamental to
national security and even national existence. The execution of mili-
tary policy, especially in its extreme manifestation of all-out nuclear
war, is no longer to be considered a servant or protector of national
political goals, but rather a possible threat in itself to these goals.
The function of disarmament now is to reduce the probabilities or
4*Q
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possibilities of nuclear war, rather than merely the capabilities of the
various national entities to wage destructive war.*
This interlocking relationship between arms control, national
defense, and foreign policy, as well as the domination of our military
policy by the advance of science and technology, has in effect broadened
the process of making disarmament policy from a function almost exclu-
sively contained within the Department of State in the past, to an ef-
fort now encompassing nearly all the agencies of the Executive Branch.
The magnitude of the attempts in recent years to reach an agreement with
the U.S.S.R. on suspension of nuclear tests and prevention of surprise
attack demonstrates not only the scope and intensity of these efforts
but also the changing concept of the goals of disarmament. The suspen-
sion of nuclear tests is not • disarmament measure, or even an arms
control measure in a strict sense, * and the prevention of surprise
attack has little connection with the historic cjoal that seeks a reduc-
tion in the level of armed forces and weapons. Rather, these are
efforts to reduce the possibilities of war through a new type of agree-
ment! the application of mutual restraint for survival. Advocates of
lThomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 196oJ7 p. 3.
^Disarmament Documents , V. II, Document 272 , p. 105U$ in response
to a query at a press conference on June 10, 1958 > Secretary Dulles
stated his opinion of the significance of a test ban: "We believe that
suspension of testing, in isolation, is a very inadequate measure. It
does not involve any disarmament, or limitation of armament, whatsoever.
To call it a • disarmament 1 measure is a misnomer. All it means is that
the aresenal of nuclear weapons that you have is accumulating without
any exact knowledge as to what the consequences of their use would be."
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these partial measures of arms control such as test bans, prevention oi
surprise attack and control of outer space, rely upon what is felt to be
compel ling interests shared by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., interests
such as reduced tension, reduced chance of accidental war, and reduced
advantage accruing to a party initiating surprise attack. It should be
emphasised that the new philosophy does not foresee substantial or even
moderate savings through arms control, but instead notes the possibility
of increased total costs because of the requirements of inspection and
control connected with an arms control agreement. Thus the new disarma-
ment philosophy has departed from the old school of economy through
disarmament, not only on the pragmatic basis that sheer survival is more
important than any economic benefits derived from reduced arms, but also
on the basis that the new political system will superimpose international
inspection and control upon the present military situation which might
be expected to be "frozen" through agreement.
Some of the raceat proposals and suggestions in the more sophis-
ticated realm of arms control were briefly mentioned in Chapter III to
demonstrate the "state of the art" of disarmament that faces government
organizers at this time. The acquisition of certain types of weapons
and weapons systems, the strategy and deployment of these weapons, the
nature of the arms the United States gives to or shares with its mill*
tary allies— these and many other related topics are the basic building
blocks for a contemporary arms control program. Without goinr into a
detailed discussion of strategy, alliances, "international gamesmanship,"
and other elements that are really the heart of many recent proposals,
it should be sufficient to notice that the researcher, the policy-maker,
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and the negotiator that prepare and act upon the positions of the U,
Government in disarmament matters must both represent and have extensive
knowledge of all facets of national power.
This calls for an agency of the government that i3 able to repre-
sent not only the major departments of the Executive Branch, but also
the will of the American people as expressed in the Congress. A reading
of the literature of the last several years that deals with the disarma-
ment issue would indicate that there has been practically no coordina-
tion or cooperation among the several agencies. Some statements
supporting the establishment by Congress of a United States Disarmament
Agency for World Peace and Security in 196i tended to indicate that
there has been no such mutual, cooperative effort. Actually, there has
bean extensive coordination between State, Defense, the AEC, and others—
not all completely harmonious and effective, of course. Personnel from
the major departments indicate both officially and unofficially their
satisfaction with the 'open channels" between State and the other
agencies. On the substantive issues there is often strong disagreement,
of course, as each department looks to what it considers its primary
responsibilities and interests.
The issue should not be whether there has be^n coordination among
the governmental agencies, and not even whether this coordination has
been sufficient,^ because no one will ever admit sufficiency in such a
^Senator Humphrey, for example, has complained about the opera-
tion of "executive privilege" by President Eisenhower in not releasing
the eight reports compiled by Stassen's disarmament advisers in 1955
and 1956, a compendium which Governor Stassen hailed as a detailed
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human enterprise; the issue instead should be whether the existing
coordination has been directed along the most fruitful channels. Has a
locus of disarmament expertise within the government been established?
Is there in existence a body of experts in this field representative of
all departments concerned that is able to clarify and resolve for the
President's decision the basic issues of disarmament policy? Is there a
research endeavor sufficiently detached from the other agencies that can
provide technical advice and thorough political studies? These and many
other tests should be applied to answer in part the question of the
direction of inter- agency coordination.
Basic issues and conflict would by necessity have to be thrashed
out at the highest level, with decisions on many subjects deferred to the
President. At first glance, the National Security Council might appear
to be the body that could best perform this function. Yet, despite the
obvious limitations (which are often exaggerated) of any interdepart-
mental committee effort, the National Security Council lias other
limitations. Its meetings are attended regularly by persons who have
little immediate concern with disarmament per se, such as the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Director of the Budget, etc. For this reason, as
well as the fact that the National Security Council has usually been
overburdened with "routine" matters, it has been often the practice to
operating manual for disarmament. This is one example of an age-old
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resolve hign- i<-.v<,i disarmament matters outside the National Security
Council, despite substantial comment to the contrary.
The result was neither a void in interdepartmental cooperation
nor a c t reliance upon informal channels of communication.
President Truman had established an interdepartmental Regulation of
Armaments Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense
and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Most of the work on
disarmament matters at this time wa.i at a staff level, however, and
the principal members ''met infrequently."-' It should be borne in air
that this was a sterile period for disarmament, with an ever- increasing
'Th* White House press, release of March 19, 195>5> announcing the
appointment of ftr. Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament, noted that the "broad studies, investigations, and con-
clusions" of Mr. Stassen's staff must be concurred in by the National
Security Council before they ". . . becarae baste policy toward the
question of disarmament.'' In a radio and television report to the
nation by Secretary Dulles on July 22, 1957, on the subject of Disarma-
ment and Peace, the Btcrttftty stated that -ubstantive decisions
(of disarmament) are made by President Eisenhower, after taking account
of the views represented on the National Security Council." Yet in
actual practice, although the National Security Council often has—and
does—discuss disarmament and its relationship with national security
policy, the National security Council has not developed basic disarma-
ment policy as such. Perhaps a "line of least resistance" has been
fol loved, with policy being developed at State with informal support and
coordination from Defense and the AEC. This has been suggested by
Saville Davis, "Recent Policy Making in the United States Government,"
DonaiiG. Brennan, ed., Arms Contro l, Disarmament , and National Security
(New York j George Braziller, 1961), p. 3ttb. Er. Davis states tTrnE
"... when Mr. Dulles wantec help he chose it from his own staff, from
the Disarmanent Division of the State Department. Dulle3 never let this
subject become implicated in the processes of the National Security
Council."
^Ibid ., p. 387. Also see Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments ,
pp. 10lt-5 for a brief description of the Executive Committee for the









level of international tension leading up to the Korean war and the
rearming by the Western powers. Disarmament and other related studies
were still undertaken, but a high degree of enthusiast and confidence
was not in evidence. Also, the center of disarmament negotiations at
this time was more within, rather than outside, the United Nations,
where perhaps more productive negotiations could have been conducted.
It has often been stated that the aid- 1950' s was our "one good
opportunity" to establish effective international inspection and control
of existing armaments, with an implementation of disarmament by stages.
This period has passed; and as the subject of arms control has been
politically more popular, criticism of the Eisenhower Administration for
Its ineffective disarmament efforts has become prevalent, tome of the
bases of this criticism have already been mentioned; It is the purpose
at this time to examine the general development of our organisational
framework from 1953 to the summer of 1961.
The first year or two of the Eisenhower Administration were
involved with concluding operations in Korea and redefining military
policy, and with the exception of the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace"
proposal, these years were rather devoid of serious disarmament activity.
Several events previously noted led up to the appointment of Governor
Stassen in March, 1955, as Special Assistant to the President for Dis-
armament. There is no determining the most significant of these events,
but one development of primary importance was undoubtedly the very
strong feelings of the President in favor of determined attempts to
reach agreement with the Soviet Union over control of the arms race.
Whether one agrees with a fairly common opinion that more should have
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been done during this period, it is obvious that there was an extensive
departure from the previous course of disarmament activities in the
government.
The White House press release of March 19, 19$5, broadly defined
Mr. Stassen's position and responsibilities
. . i for developing, on behalf of the President and the State
Department, the broaa studies, investigations, and conclusions,
which, when concurred in . . . will become basic policy toward
the question of disarmament."
The role of the Congress was recognised:
When indicated as desirable or appropriate under our con-
stitutional processes, concurrences will be secured from trie
Congress prior to specific action or pronouncement of policy.'
However, this was a rather begrudging admission of the preroga-
tives of the Congress, as indicated by the "desirable or appropriate**
qualification. Congressional- Executive cooperation in the disarmament
field has been slow in developing despite efforts by both branches of
the government. As the importance and political significance of the
subject grew, however, the amount of contact and cooperation between the
two branches increased so that by 1961 they could be described as satis-
factory. By this time, the Subcommittee on Disarmament under the
competent leadership of Senator Humphrey had made its influence felt on
the several agencies within the Executive; at the same time, a small
body of disarmament experts was developing in these agencies and chan-
nels of communication were established among them and with the Congress.
^White House Press Release , March 19, 1955.
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A change In the international scene of great Importance was
briefly recognized in the press relea
The recent session of the Disarmament Commission of the
Uniteu Nations has again resulted in no progress and no clear
crystallization of thinking on this subject.
8
Perhaps unwittingly, this statement illuminated the impending
shift in the locus of disarmament negotiations primarily from the United
Rations to multilateral conferences outside the scope of the United
Nations. Gradually, the size of disarmament conferences were to be
numerically reduced until, in the spring of I96l, it was reported that
the United States and the Soviet Union would hold bilateral talks.
Although there Is still much disarmament debate in the General Assembly,
the influence of the United Nations in disarmament matters had been
eclipsed, at least temporarily.
The broad scope of disarmament policy was also noted in the press
release of March 19, 1955. Governor Stassen wast
. . . expected to take into account the full implications of
new weapons in the possession of other nations as well as the
United States, to consider future probabilities of armaments, and
to weigh the views of the military, the civilians, and the officials
of our Government and of other governments.?
Although Mr. Stassen was given cabinet rank by the President to
emphasize the importance given to this new position, he was not put at
the head of an independent agency but was Instead given a hybrid staff
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In the spring of 1955 $ the President specified the responsi-
bilities of the Special Assistant and his working relationships
vith other parts of the executive branch. In August of 1955 the
latter was informed that he would be Deputy United states
Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission to
sit for the United states in the Subcommittee of said Commission.
In that capacity Mr. Stassen was to serve under the direction of
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Representative
to the United Nations. If the Special Assistant dealt with other
nations outside the framework of the United Nations, he would
work under Mr. Dulles. In other aspects of his duties, he would
report to the President. 1^
Mr. Stassen's connections with the major departments of the
Executive Branch, through direct communication as well as the National
Security Council, his direct access to the President and his cabinet
status enhanced the prestige of the position of the Special Assistant
for Disarmament.
Hr. Stassen had a large order to fill without substantial finan-
cial end personnel support. A bouy of nine officials composed of
selected persons fro© the Departiaents of State, Army, Navy, and Air
Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the International Cooperation
Administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency formed his immediate
staff.
Members of the staff assist Mr. Stassen on the basis of their
experience in their own agencies but they do not represent or
bind their parent agencies. They are not representatives of the
executive agencies as are the members of the President's Special
Committee. As a matter of practice, however, the members of the
Special Assistant's staff keep in touch with the action officers
handling disarmament questions in their own departments and
agencies. 11
^Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments
, p. 107.
illbia., p. 109.










This is the first example in the field of disarmament of experts
being loaned from one agency to another in order to supply technical
advice, and not to represent the parent agency. In some respects,
perhaps, these special advisers are orphans cut off frost their parent
department and not fully utilised in their nev positions. Their status
and value has gradually itiproved in recent years, however.
Also created was the President's Special Committee on Disarmament
Problems, mentioned in the quotation above. The Special Committee was
composed of representatives of the following departments and agencies*
State, Defense (and the Joint Chiefs tf Staff), AIC, Justice, CIA, ar.
USIA. The Special Committee was not established with the specific
charge of formulating basic U.S. disarmament policy; instead, its pur-
pose was "to provide maximum effectiveness in carrying forward a concen-
trated endeavor to reach a souno disarmament agreement under effective
safeguards," to keep the represented agencies informed, and serve "as a
medium of exchange of views." *2 Staff preparation for the Special Com-
mittee was accomplished by the Disarmament Staff.
This organisation still left a gaping hole in the area of long-
range research for disarmament within the government. This hole was
partly plugged in early October, 1955* ^y the creation of eight task
forces by Mr. Jtassen for the review of U.S. disarmament policy.
^
*2lbid., p. 106.
13Ibid ., pp. 109-10. These task forces undertook research in the
following areasi nuclear inspection, aerial inspection, inspection of
navies and navy aircraft and missiles, inspection of army and ground




















Coaaendable and timely as this effort was, it should be recognized that
the eight task forces were concentrated in the technical fields of
inspection of nuclear installation, military unit3, and industry. This
concentration on the technical aspects of an arras control agreement is
symptomatic of the disarmament efforts of the United states, at least
during most of the negotiations. There seems to be almost an obsession
with the "practical," a desire to devise what appears to be a "fair"
control system that is sure to appeal to the other nations. Yet the
United States seriously neglects the necessary fundamental studies in
the realm of ideologies and disarmament philosophies of other states,
and does not effectively relate disarmament to national goals.
It is impossible, of course, to define an "unchanging" funda-
mental goal or national interest, but a thorough study and enunciation
of political objectives by a competent, representative organization
composed of an elite group of statesmen could provide the guidelines, or
the basic direction for the separate disarmament agencies and committees.
There are serious problems involved in attempting such a definition of
political objectives, and these problems would have to be recognized and
adjusted to as effectively as possible. Individual Congressmen, for
example, are hardly going to be bound by any set of values and objec-
tives prescribed by the Executive Branch. This is as it should
because the members of Congress must be effective representatives of the
public view.
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An sat example of the conflict between operating diseraa-
aent decisions and political objectives is the bearing that ailitary
strategy and weapons have on disarmament policy. Current discussion of
anas control ofWn centaio on the theory of stabilized deterrent, for
exa&pl'. , as a means of reducing international tension and the chance of
war by accident or miscalculation. Uni . ates ailitary policy since
shortly after World War II has been priority one of deterrence, but
often weapons systems and strategy tend to create an unstable situation,
accoraing to the j fttl of anus stabilization. Bombers on airborne
alert, dependent upon perfect comuuinicat ions and the proper functioning
of the "fail- safe" system, exemplify the "hair trigger*1 factor that
needs to be constrained without reducing the element of deterrence and
its effect. It appears that the present Administration employs the
concept of stable deterrence. An example of this is the decision not
to produce the B-70 (or R.S-73) at this time, although international
stability probably was not the principle factor in this particular
decision.
1 jccretary of Defense McMaaara has elaborated on our basic
ailitary deterrent posture: 'essentially, there are two major ap-
proaches available to us: (i) develop forces which can be launched
within the expected period of tactical warning, roughly 15 minutesj
(2) develop forces which can it a massive ICBH attack ....
Accordingly, in reevaluating our general war position, our
major concern was to reduce our dependence on deterrent forces which
arc highly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack or which rely for
their survival on a hair-trigger response to the first indications of
such an attack. Conversely, we sought to place greater emphasis on
the second approach— the kind of forces which could ride out a massive
nuclear attack and which could be applied with deliberation and always
under the complete control of the constituted authority." United States
Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense
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This has been merely one example of the close relationship
between military strategy and modern arms control, iiven more critical
decisions aire required, in the opinion of this writer, in political
matters. It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that, although we use the term
"inspection and control" rather loosely, most systems of inspection that
are discussed really do not aelve deeply into the problem of control, or
the political problem of how violations or suspected violations are to
be hanuiea. There is a need ior a government organisation that can
reasonably cope with these fundamental issues. Recent action taken by
the previous and the present administrations indicate that the problem
has been recognised ana is being approachea with constructive endeavor.
There was formed in 195>9 a group known as the "Com&ittee of Prin-
cipals, 11 composed of the heads oi departments and agencies that were
concerned principally with disarmament matters. This Committee consists
of the Secretaries of state and Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic
Energy w-*amission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The
function of the Committee of Principals is usually mentioned in terms of
coordination rather than formulation of disarmament policy. It is a
little known body that meets at tne call of the Secretary of State, but
has no secretariat, no funds, and no formal schedule.
The activities of the Committee of Principals are not publicised.
Although it is to be hoped that the Principals have orappied with the
1st Session, on H.R. 7651, April l8-July 26, 1961 (Washingtonj Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), p. 5.
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fundamental issues of disarmament and its relation to the security of
the nation, it seems probable that the Committee has been reduced to a
tradinc mart for reconciling opposing vievs on specific issues of arms
control policy, rather than the formulation of theoretical political
concepts. *->
A positive step toward the development of a more effective organi-
zation was the establishment of the Disarmament Administration in
September, I960. Although the Di sarmawent Administration was not con-
sidered a prototype for the Disarmament Agency proposed to Congress in
June, 1961, much operational experience was gained in the year the
Disarmament Administration functioned. The Disarmament Administration
and its successor are treated in Chapters V and VIII.
It may be recalled that the center of disarmament planning
shifted from the White House back to the Department of State after ftr.
Stassen's resignation in early 1956. From this time until the formation
of the Disarmament Administration, disarmament planning at :;tate was
conducted in the office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and
Atomic Energy. Although specific coordination was spelled out for
Mr. Sta9sen*s post at the White House and the Department of State, it
was felt by many that more effective development of policy would ensue
^For a brief treatment of the Committee 3ee Strengthening the
Gey---- :^ ; -.z ^c::Lroi (Waaainottfti iiintionai Pi—Blag AJtoc iatloa,
l£o0)
, pp. "lS^17. After a short discussion of the weaknesses of com-
mittee efforts in the government, and especially the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the report notes that "an interdepartmental 'Committee of
Principal j • i . now used in arms control policy planning and the results
are not satisfactory."
ift* <*« ISO fV
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with the disarmament office physically and administratively linked with
the Departsent of State.
cion among the variou . .rtment.. agencies remained
relatively the same after the esttab 12.shun it of the Disarmament Adminis-
tration. Tiit; Committee of Principals w ill the primary body that
collectively represented the uisarat «>iaaiunity. It is important to
note that, although the principal Bents exchange a num-
ber of personnel to proviue te< rent views, etc.,
these persons are not suppose nt their parent agencies) and
as their exchange tour progresses, they tend to broaden their parochial
outlook to a certain extent. Yet, Uh probably no way of sub-
stantially diminishing inter- aepartsaental coordination through the
establishment of a new agency.
This has been a sketch of the broad picture of disarmament











THE Q6HlRT«anr OF STATE
The primary responsibility for the development o£ disarmament
policy, with the exception of the office of the Presidency and the first
two years of rfr. Stassen's role, has always bean in the Department of
State. This is a realisation, tacit or otherwise, that disarmament is
aerely ana segment of foreign policy. To be sure, disarmament contains
problems peculiar to itself* It has always been an euotional issue,
with many international implications. It is closely related to military
strategy. And it is a technical problem as well as a political one,
with no effective separation of the two. IS there has been any firm
basis to U.S. disarmament policy since trior Id War II, it has bvtn our
insistence upon effective international inspection and control of arma-
ments, and this in itself is a highly technical problem.* Yet, as has
been mentioned earlier, any technical problem eventually resolves into
a political question or issue, in the area of inspection and control,
for example, the political issue is basically a matter of risk. The
technical experts may decide that a 10-kiloton weapon, as an example,
exploded underground may be detected as a weapon at a distance of I
miles with pernaps a 75 per cent or 85 per cent probability. The
^Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments
, pp. 7&-75> lists several
constants of U.S. disarmament policy. The first constant was that no
"reliable disarmament agreement can be reached unless it is completely
covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to verify reduc-
tions and guard against surprise attack.'*
gun ,- •;. . .-sum vi
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decision whether to base an agreement on ttiis probability then becomes
a aatter of risk acceptability. The political expert at State, or the
ultimate authority at the White House, in charged with the responsibility
of balancing the tvo risk curves against each others the present risk
of nuclear war in an anas race, versus the potential risk that an
opponent aay be able to cheat successfully, once in a while, under any
inspection system. In other words, technical problems, which have so
often come under the purview of other departments such as Defense and
the AEC, eventually are dwarfed by the larger political Issues, which
fall within the ambit of ;tate responsibility.
As has been notee, i; ional disarmament negotiations were
largely confined to the United Nations in the decade or so following
World War II. Perhaps for this reason as well as any other, the office
within the State Department charged with developing, coordinating, and
implementing 9*S. disarmament policy was the Office of United nations
Affairs, which was later known as the Bureau of International Affairs.
Whenever extensive negotiations were contemplated or in progress, ad
hoc groups of policy makers as well as negotiators were assembled.
Some of these were from the Department of State, some from other agen-
cies, and often some were selected from citizens not actively engaged
In government work. These last were usually quite competent persons,
^Much of the information on the development of disarmament
organisation within the State Department Ea taken from Appendix
Report on 5, 2180 , Creating a Un i Isarmament Agency for
World Peace ar" ity
,
/n.c./, prep > the Office of tLTASvi..-
to the President on Disarmament, hereafter cited as Heport on J. 2160 .











inguished in their non- governmental professions. The daily opera-
tions within the Department of State that related to disarmanent,
however, were relegated to a small group of four or five professionals
located in the Bureau of International Affairs.
In these early days, anus control efforts were centered on
various approaches to controlling atomic energy. The Acheson Committee
of Five wa3 selected in January, 19U6, to prepare a program for the
international control of atomic energy. A group of consultants under
the leadership 01 Rr* Davie Lilienthal was appointed later that month
to work on the same subject in connection with the Achesm Committee.
Their combined efforts produced the "Report on the International Control
of Atomic energy" in warch, 19U6. This report was generally known as
the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan that was to serve as the basis of the Baruch
proposal presented co toe United Nations Atomic energy Commission later
that year.
The Acheson-Lilienthal group was the first ad hoc task force on
disarmament; and although it was also the only such group established
prior to 1955, it set a precedent in disarmament organization that was
to be followed extensively in later years. Although ad hoc groups were
employed in practically all aspects of disarmament, their Iff was
centered In the panels of technical experts and negotiating teams. Some
of the strongest criticism of the government's disarmament efforts has
been directed toward the method of selecting and preparing an ad hoc
group for an international disarmament conference. In the past, some
negotiating teams have had as little as a month or so to get acquainted
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prepare the United States position. Huch has been made of the lack of
continuity in U.~. negotiating teams (as well as the planners and policy
aakers) and it is reasonable to assume that the failure to veld a
cohesive group of technical experts and negotiators has resulted In
weaker policy and negotiating positions. Whether it has also been
3
responsible in any way for lack of progress is open to question.
An excellent description of our organization during this period
of ten or so years after World War II states thatj
During most of this period, there was no central administra-
tive unit in which responsibility for the planning and coordina-
tion of disarmament policy was focused. Personnel engaged in
disarmament studies or planning were scattered among a number of
departments and agencies. The total staff specializing in
disarmament problems was small. In the Department of State,
where primary responsibility for policy lay, the disarmament
staff usually comprised no more than h professionals. For the
development of policy plans as well as technical studies, the
Government was heavily dependent upon ad hoc committees. In
the conduct of negotiations, limited staff made it difficult to
maintain continuity in American representation. From 19U6 on,
United states delegations to various disarmament conferences
were led by some 16 different chiefs.**
The report continues!
Between 19^6 and 19$5 the United States was represented at
ore than UO international conferences at which disarmament was
discussed. Among the first of these were meetings of the UN
Atomic Energy Commission in 191*6, at which fir, Bernard #• Baruch
presented the American proposals for international control of
-"In a speech at Phillips Andover Academy, Andover, Massachusetts,
on February 25, 1961, John J, $cCloy paid high tribute to the leaders
of our negotiating teams in the past, and added: "In my judgment, the
delays and frustrations that have plagued the negotiations thus far
have been due more to the great difficulties of the problem than to any
inadequacies of plans or planners." Department of state, Press Release
to. 66, February 2u, 1961,













atomic energy. In addition to UNAEC, the UN forums created for
disarmament were the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments,
established in 19l7, the UN Disarmament Commission, established
in 1952 and representing the merger of UNABC and UBCCAj and begin-
ning in 19$U 9 the UN Disarmament Subcommittee composed of the
"powers principally involved." Over this period, there were ten
principal United States Sepiesent. 1 "saraament negotia-
tions conducted by these UN bodies.^
The early years after the war, then, were characterized by the
concentration of effort to attempt to react- an agreement on the inter-
national control of atomic energy. As the antagonism between the
U.S.S.K. and the Vest mounted and the Soviets made it clear they would
have nothing to do with the Baruch Plan, disarmament efforts stagnated.
For several years, the Disarmament Staff at the Department of State was
fairly constant in its complement of six or less full-time persons.
This was, despite its size, a capable, experienced staff, and it
was put to use by Secretary Dulles to a greater extent than previously.
It was characteristic of Mr. Dulles to hold as closely as possible the
reins of disarmament policy, as well as foreign policy in general. This
resulted in a reduced utilization of the National Security Council and
the Regulation of Armaments Committee.
When Mr. Stassen was appointed as Special Assistant to the
President for Disarmament in March, 1955, the responsibility for dis-
armament policy shifted to the fchite House, at least for the first two
years of ftr. Stassen 1 3 tenure. There was a considerable flurry of
activity in these years, centered around Stassen* s Disarmament Staff,
5Ibid., p. 3.
^Donald Q. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control , Disarmament , and National
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the Presi cent's Special Conedttee on Disarmament Problems, and the eight
task forces dealing with the technical problems of inspection and control,
However, in March of 1957, Stassen and his Deputy special Assist-
ant were transferred to the Department of State.
Mr. Stassen 1 s office in State, s/DA, was charged with the
responsibility of working, under the Secretary's direction, on
negotiations with other governments on disarmament, Mr. Stassen'
3
transfer to the State Department was made just days prior to his
departure for London for the Disarmament Subcommittee meetings.
After the London meetings Mr. Stassen returned to Washington in
September 1957 and remained in his position until he resigned in
February 1953. The organizational unit responsible to his office
was disbanded at this time.?
Ifo official reason has been riven for this momentous change. It
would be easy to seize upon Internal struggles as the background for
Stassen' 3 transfer to the control of the Secretary of State, even though
the disarmament policy battle within the Administration was not publicly
noted at length until two months later. More likely, the reason for
the shift wa3 to coordinate the preparation of U.S. negotiating posi-
tions more effectively within the govermaent and with allies, although
internal Administration battles probably were of some importance.
' Report on S. 2180 , Appendix C, p. 5.
ag
~ee Chalmers H. Roberts, "Stassen Undercut on Arms Control,"
The Washington Post , June 3, 1957, p. 17 $ and David Lawrence "i^ystery of
Stassen' 3 Doner," The Evening Star (Washington), June lL, 1957, p. 20.
In a speech by Senator Kennedy at the University of New Hampshire,
March 7, I960, the Senator 3tated that ;assen'3 efforts as a
special disarmament negotiator were consistently undercut and opposed in
the Pentagon, A£C, and State Department , ignored in the White House."
State, Disarmament Documents , I960, p. 63.
?The subcommittee on Disarmament, in its report on Control and
Reduction of Armaments
, p. 15, noted that "there is as a result, less
chance that the United States will appear abroad as speaking with two,
and sometimes conflicting, voices on disarmament questions." Also, on
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Following the transfer of disarmament responsibility from the
White House to the Department of State , the organization situation
stabilized for a period of nearly two and one-haIf years, and served as
a working model for the later development of the U.S. Disarmament Admin-
istration in several respects. The following official description of
the organization during this period cannot be improved upon for concise-
ness and brevityt
Following the resignation of Mr* Stassen, the Secretary of
State announced on February 27, 1958, the designation of
Ambassador James J. Wadsworth to act, under the Secretary*
s
direction, as United States representative in future disarma-
ment negotiations. At this time steps were also taken to expand
the Departments administrative machinery for disarmament:
1) A high-level advisory group was named to consult with the
Secretary on disarmament policy. General Alfred M. Gruenther,
Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Mr* John J, McCloy, and General Walter
Bedell Smith were requested by the Secretary to serve in this
capacity.
2) The responsibility for policy and substantive aspects of
disarmament was transferred from the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs (10) to the Special Assistant for Atomic
Energy Affairs (s/AE). The change was announced on March 27,
1958. Mr. Philip J. Farley, head of s/AE, was given the new
title of Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.
The disarmament section of s/AE, which in 1957 had numbered
four officers, was assigned additional staff and funds. By
fiscal year I960 the disarmament staff of s/AE numbered 20
positions.
p. 65, the report discussed the reason for the transfer of this office
to State. "The operation of the Office of Special Assistant did have
its drawbacks, however. Disarmament policy appeared to be formulated
without achieving the best possible coordination with the Department of
State and, therefore, tended to be divorced from other and related
aspects of foreign policy. Furthermore, there were times when the
President's Disarmament Assistant and other officials of the executive
branch made conflicting statements about American proposals and this
resulted in confusion as to United States' policy. 1'
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3) Mr. Charles A. Coolidge was named by the Secretary of State
on July 29, 1959, to head a Joint Disarmament Study, on behalf of
the Departments of State and Defense. lie was directly responsible
to the Secretary of State.
The Coolidge group vas to "consider comprehensive and partial
measures of arms control and reduction which if internationally
agreed would contribute to the achievement of United States
national security objectives." Their report was originally to be
submitted by April I960 but because of the prospective Ten-Nation
disarmament talks its completion was requested by the end of
1°5°« The report, which was dated January I960, was prepared as
a working paper for submission jointly to the Secretaries of
State and Defense.
Mr. Coolidge* s full time professional staff totalled 17 persons
including a civilian deputy, a military deputy and a technical
deputy. Six officers from State, five from Defense, and one each
from A£C, CIA, and IDA were included on the staff. In addition
to a full-time staff, part-time assistance was given by six
research associates from institutions such as the Rand Corporation,
Stanford Research Institute and the Operations Research Organiza-
tion. 1°
It vas earlier stated that after the failure of the disarmament
negotiations in August, 1957, the negotiations bogged down the next
year on the subject of surprise attack and a ban on nuclear tests. In
the period 1958 to I960, it became increasingly obvious that negotia-
tions on such highly technical subjects required extensive research,
continuity of personnel and objectives, and an agency close to both the
President and the Secretary of State. There were other reasons, also,
for the promulgation, on September 9, I960, of the order establishing
the United States Disarmament Administration, but the essential motiva-
tion was the realization that arms control had become a very complicated,
expensive, painstaking process requiring a high level of competence and
coordination; that success was not to be gained in the next few months
1QReport on S. 2180 , Appendix C, pp. 5-6.
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or perhaps even years but the seriousness still demanded the effortj
and, that perhaps U.S. disarmament policy in the past had not been a3
thoroughly prepared as it might have been.
Accordingly, the announcement of the establishment of the new
Disarmament Administration stated that
The Administration will be responsible to the Secretary of
State and will be staffed with personnel drawn from other
agencies and from outside government as well as from the Depart-
ment of State.
In addition to coordinating an intensified program of study
and research, the new organization will be responsible for
formulating policy recommendations for consideration within the
U.S. Government with respect to the limitation and control, by
international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all
kinds and for the direction and support of international nego-
tiations on these matters.
It will marshal in a single unit political, military,
scientific and technical skills in a continuing effort to
discover reliable means for easing the burden of armaments,
lessening the dangers of war by miscalculation, and helping
to promote a just and durable peace. **
The disarmament functions in the Office of the Special Assistant
for Disarmament and Atomic Energy were transferred to the new Adminis-
tration shortly after its creation. The importance of its role in
policy formulation is indicated by its mission:
... to assist the Secretary of State in formulating disarma-
ment and arms control policies and basic positions consistent with
national security for consideration within the United States Govern-
ment, and in negotiating International agreements in this field. 12
11Department of State, Press Release No. 520, September 9, I960.
12Department of State, Organisation of the United States Disarma-
ment Administration
,
Department Circular Humber 370, October 12, I960,
p. 1.
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The Disarmament Administration was the first significant attempt
to gather together in one agency the personnel, material support, and
organisational capability required to generate basic, Ions-range die-
armament policy, develop a body of experts, establish a source of
negotiating teams, coordinate the activities of the other agencies, and
supervise the implementation of disarmament policy. Its success can be
fairly measured in these terms alone.
Although the Disarmament Administration was responsible to the
Secretary of State, it enjoyed an informal and semi-autonomous status
with its own administrative unit, separate budget, and access to the
President through the relationship between the Agency and the Office of
Adviser to the President on Disarmament:
Mr. McCloy was to make recommendations to the President on the
formulation of U.S. policy on disarmament and also on the organi-
sation of the staff within the Government which was to have
primary responsibility for disarmament. The staff of USDA as
well as personnel from other agencies were made available to him
in the discharge of his responsibilities.^
The Administration was headed by a Director, a Deputy Director,
and an Assistant Deputy Director* There was both an Administrative
Section and a Secretariat to handle personnel and other functions of an
administrative nature.
The Disarmament Administration was responsible to the Secretary
of State through the Under Secretary; a second channel of communication
upward was provided by the close relation between the Administration and
the Office of the Adviser to the President on Disarmament. The Adviser
^Report on S. 2180 , Appendix C, p. 7,
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was assisted in the Disarmament Agency by a small section known as the
Staff. The three or four Bcftbtra of the Staff, in addition to serving
as a link between the Administration and the Office of th*: Adviser to
the President, provided continuity and meaningful direction to the
operations of the Disarmament Administration.
In addition to the offices just mentioned, there were four prin-
cipal sections of the Disarmament Administrations Public Information,
Policy, Political, anci studies. Unfortunately, disarmament policy is
not developed in such clearly defined segments, and in actual practice
the last three sections have functioned so closely together that ic is
nearly meaningless to attempt to define their separate missions.
The purpose of the Public Information Office is apparent in its
title, especially regarding its functions with the news media. Beyond
the usual scope of public affairs, the Public Information Office ful-
filled the important function of working closely with the United States
Information Agency to ensure thorough coverage of United states disara*-
ment policy abroad.
The itu'ies section provided the basic background material for
the work done in the Policy and Political sections. The Studies section
was further subdivided into subsections entitled Projects and Research.
A recurring complaint of the disarmament program of the United States
Government in the past has been directed not necessarily at the quantity
of research undertaken within the government, but at the locus of this
research. Most of the disarmament research has been conducted for the















Commission, two agencies considered by many critics not to be too
enthusiastic about efforts toward disarmament . The Studies section of
the Disarmament Administration consisted of about sixteen persons, not
including clerical assistance. Increased research activity at the
Department of State ha3 not been intended to duplicate or replace tne
technical research facilities available in the Department of Defense or
the Atomic Energy Commission, except perhaps on a very limited labora-
tory scale. Research facilities within the Disarmament Administration
would be limited in physical size and scope of operation, designed
primarily to coordinate the research studies of the other agencies.
The Policy section was primarily responsible for the development
of basic United States disarmament policy, employing the research and
studies production to establish the fundamental policies that formed the
basis of the more specific negotiating positions developed by the
Political section. The Political section might well be termed the
operating section of the Administration. The Political section was
headed by a Director and Deputy Director; the Political section provided
not only current negotiating positions but also provided most of the
officers for the delegations empowered to conduct negotiations. Within
this section there were divisions for both Nuclear Test Negotiations and
General Disarmament, each headed by an Officer- in-Charge.
^For example, the United States Disarmament Agency had $IiOO,000
to spend on "studies" for fiscal year 1961, whereas the Department of
Defence has been allocated approximately $60,000,000 for Project Vela
alone.
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A recognition of the need for greater disarmament efforts within
the United States Government, particularly in the research and studies
area, is indicated by the rapid growth of disarmament activities in the
Department of State in I960 and 1961, Testifying before the Senate
Appropriation 3 Subcommittee in June, 1961, Mr. Edmund A. Gull ion, the
Deputy Director (and acting Director) of the Disarmament Agency, com-
mented that
We have authorized 38 positions. In order to get the work done,
we have had to borrow the services of outside consultants t,
rely upon people lent to us by other ncUs. ¥e now have at
work actually both officer and clerical, 66 people plus 16 con-
sultants from outside. 1^'
From a total of twenty positions in I960 in the Office of the
Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, the disarmament
efforts expanded to an authorized level of thirty-eight positions in
1961 but an actual force level of eighty-six. It was anticipated that
the personnel strength of the new Agency for World Peace and Security
would gradually increase to approximately two hundred and fifty. Al-
though research activities will continue to consume a major portion of
this increase, there is no anticipated decrease in the research programs
in support of disarmament that are conducted by agencies other than the
Department of Stats. The facilities possessed by the Department of
Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, in particular, cannot be
duplicated in any practicable manner.
l%nited States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Departments of State , Justice , the Judiciary , and Related Agencies
AppropriaETons /"1962 , Hearings Before Suocommitkee, 07th Congress, 1st
Session, on H.R. 73^1* June 13-July 11, 196l (Washington! Government
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The improvement in the organization of the United State* Govern-
aent for disarmament rests not simply in these numerical increases just
mentioned, but rather in recognition of the leading role of the Depart-
ment of State both in formulating disarmament policy and in coordinating
the disarmament functions of other agencies.

CHAPTER VI
THE DEPARTHEKT OF D£Fi*
As a result of several factors, including (1) the present empha-
sis on arms control vice conventional disarmament! (2) the technical
requirements of international inspection systeasj and (3) the relation*
ship of anus control to Military strategy, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has played an ever- increasing role in both the support of research
and the shaping of disarmament policy. There have been efforts to la-
prove governmental organization for arms control, especially in the
coordination of the views of the separate departments, and efforts to
reduce the amount of reliance of the President and the Secretary of
State upon the conclusions reached in technical research projects that
have been produced under the supervision of the DOD. Inherent in these
attempts to improve organisation is the recognition that no effective
organization for arms control can omit the participation of the DOD in
the formulation of disarmament policy. Military policy and arms control
policy are too closely linked to attempt to study the one without at the
same time examining the requirements of the other. Attempts to increase
the efficacy of our arms control organisation become, then, at least in
part, a matter of prescribing the role of the DOD in the formulation of
arms control policy within the general context of the security of the
United states.
ace disarmament policy is an integral part of national security
policy, the Department of Defense has bean an interested party to any
disarmament matter that might have been discussed by the national
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Security Council (asc) since its inception in 19k7. Problems of cis-
armam^nt became so unique soon after Wftrld kfar II that President Truman
formed the Reduction of Armaments Committee, compose- of representatives
of the Apartments of jtatc and Defense, and the Atomic Bnarggr Commission.
Whereas the M3C wa3 the body charged with the treatment of the broad
implications of disarmament policy upon defense policy, and vice versa
,
the Reduction of Armaments Coamuttee was more lifce an inner council
charged with the development of specific disarmament policy. It is not
inaccurate to suggest that the Reduction of Armaments Committee, in a
manner similar to the NSC, became a group of persons interested primarily
not in the positive aspects of developing national policy but rather in
the negative role of reconciling divergencies of opinion among the
departments concerned. The result was, as has often been allegec, not
decisive policy decisions but more often compromises that offended no
department and permitted each individual agency a maximum degree of
independence in its interpretation of disarmament policy.
This is, of course, similar to much of the criticism of the
decision-making process of any committee such as the National Security
Council or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example. Such criticism is
valid if two conditions existt (1) there is a strong divergency of
opinion among the committee members] and (2) there is not sufficiently
strong leadership directing the committee effort that will overcome the
parochial views of the members, while at the same time allowing maximum
discussion of these divergent views. Effective policy making depends
upon this type of leadership regardless of the nature of the group ef-
fort.
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Within the government there Is recognition of the conservative
view of the Departaent of Defense towa- -armament. The military
think naturally in terms of military operations when considering
national security, and it is not necessarily strange that their outlook
soaatiaes clashes with policy makers at the Department of State who are
charged with the responsibility of fore Ucy and disarmament policy,
The problem becoaes one of reconciling conflicts of opinion rather than
technical Issues. The prioary purpose of this paper is to qutstion
whether there has been sufficient effort in the past to ravltt the
organization of our government for arms control so that these i can
be discussal to the fullest extent, resulting in the formulation of
basic policy that will serve as a foundation in disarmament negotiation.
The disaraament effort within the Department of Defense has not
been as centralized as at the Department of tate. Not only are the
three services individually concerned with disarmament issues, but the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and many oth*
subdivisions become equally involved. The ate represents a mam-
moth organization whose complexity seea3 to defy significant change or
even comprehensive analysis by an outside observer. Yet there is a very
distinct "disarmament community" within the Department of Defense (where
the term arm3 control is preferred to disarmament) that has well-
established channels of communication internally as well as outside the
department. Decentralization of disarmament policy making in the DOD
among the various agencies and the three services does not necessarily
result in a confusion of disarmament opinion. The three military
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interrelation between military policy and aras control policy. of
the services on disarmament are not separately presented and advocated
within the DQO hierarchy after the individual service viev^ are coordi-
nated within the internal procedures of the Joint Cfei ff (JC .
options, such as divergent policies originating in the JC^ or the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (03D), taust be resolved at a higher
level, usually in the Committee of Principals.
I. OI : F Tit-
The Secretary of Defense should bt Uk>, personification of the
disarmament philosophy of his oepart&ent . It he believes strongly in
the Immediate goal of an international sy3tea of arms control , Bad tin
ultimate goal of disarmament, these beliefs will be reflected in the
policies of his department. Since arms control is a dominant philosophy
at this time, and the concept of stable deterrence is at the heart of
most of the arms control proposals of the United .States Govemsumt, the
views held by the Secretary of Defense on weapons and weapons systems,
deployment of forces, combat alerts, and other similar attributes of
military readiness have direct influence on disarmament policy.
The Secretary of Defense may express his disarmament philosophy
not only within his department, but also at the meetings of the National
Security Council and the Committee of Principals, and in consultation
with Um President. Although the Secretary has not been personally
questioned by the Congress regarding his views on disarmament, his testi-
mony before the Appropriations Committee reflects his adherence to the
stable deterrent theory.
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II. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF D8MI
FOR IMTERMTICEAI ITY AFFAIRS
The central authority for arxj control matters within the Depart-
ment of Defense is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ASD/lSA). ISA acts as a clearing house
for anas control projects in DOD, and is responsible for coordination
with other departments in the Executive Branch. Requests for 000 dis-
araaaent studies and policy statements cone to the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), froia the Office of the Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (or other agencies in the
Executive Branch, such as the Atomic Energy Commission) • In official
language, ISA is the "Single Agent for Interdepartmental Contact and
Defense Coordination."
Within this office there are two subdivisions that are concerned
with disarmament matters i the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Arms Control (formerly called Disarmament and Military
Affairs), and the Office of the Director of Disarmament (previously
known as the Office of Disarmament and United Rations Affairs). The
first office mentioned assists the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
on the broad policy matters related to disarmament. This office was
formerly occupied by a military officer of high rank on active duty, but
in 1961 it was transferred to a civilian, perhaps as a reflection of the
^Defense Organization for Arms Control Affairs , Organization
chart published by the Office of the Assistant secretary of Defense for
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desire of the President to strengthen civilian direction of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
The Office of Director of Disarmament is staffed by representa-
tives of the three services 9 of the grade of colonel/captain. This
office serves as the hub of the disariaaxaent activities within DOD, and
Is responsible for the general coordination of DOD disarmament programs.
It should be noted, however, that the access of the three military serv-
ices to the Office of the Secretary of Defense via the A3D/ISA is
paralleled by the chain of command from the Joint Staff to the Secretary
of Defense via the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. This access to the
Secretary of Defense is seldom, if ever, employed by the individual
services in disarmament matters.
The formal routing of disarmament matters within the DOD,
especially those requests that are received from the Department of
State, is as follows (see Appendix I)i the project or request is re-
ceived by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs; the project is studied in the Office
for Arms Control (formerly called the Office for Disarmament and
Military Affairs), and is then routed for action within the Department
of Defense. If the project deals primarily with arms control and its
relation to military strategy, it will be routed to the Joint Staff
(which supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for further handling within
the Staff and for routing among the three service departments. If,
however, it is a request for technical support, such as research on the
control of outer space as an example, the Director of Defense Research
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and Engineering (DDRaS) will receive initial routing. In either case,
the other section will be kept informed of the nature and status of the
project.
III. THfc JQIKT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Projects received at the Joint staff (from the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, via ISA) dealing with disarmament are usually con-
trolled by J-5 (Plans and Policies) or the Special Assistant for Aras
Control (SAAC, foraerly known as Special Assistant for Disarmament
Affairs) with the other interested branches acting in a coordinate
capacity. The staff of SAAC is the operational office for disarmament
natters within the Joint staff. It is responsible for the further
routing and coordination of the disaraaaent papers in the individual
services. In 1961 there were eight officers on the staff of SAAC
(increased to eleven in 1962). Seven of these were of the rank of
colonel/captain, with a major general/rear adairal as director.
IV. THE HILITAttr SERVICES
The anas control functions of the services are handled by "action
officers'' who, in addition to preparing the position of their services
on specific proposals and projects received from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, keep the senior officers in their staffs advised of current dis-
araaaent developments, both domestic and international. The organisa-
tional status for each action officer is approximately the same. The
Mavy action officers, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations
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(Opfcav), are a captain and lieutenant commander attached to the
Political-Military Policy Division (OP-61) vithin the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Havai Operations for Plans and Policy ((OP-06).
The section of the Amy staff involved in the development of
disarmament policy is located vithin the Policy Planning Branch of the
International and Political Planning Division. The specific billet is
titled Disarmament, United Nations and International Organization, and
is usually occupied by a colonel or lieutenant colonel. The Inter-
national and Political Planning Division is contained within the Deputy
Chief of staff for Military Operations.
A similar organizational structure exists in the Air Force Staff.
The officers responsible for disarmament policy in the Air Force (two
lieutenant colonels and a senior civilian in 196 1) are located vithin
the Foreign Agreements Division, under the Deputy Director for Policy
and Director of Military Plans and Programs.
£ach action officer of the services has ready access to his divi-
sion or branch head (major general/rear admiral), and is charged with
the expeditious processing of disarmament papers through the staff func-
tions of his service. The action officers remain in close contact with
their counterparts in the other services, the Joint Staff, and in ISA.
There is also effective liaison between the action officers of the mili-
tary services and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (formerly the
United states Disarmament Agency) • This liaison is generally maintained
vith the military representatives who are assigned to the weapons evalua-
tion and Control Bureau of the Agency.
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V. RESEARCH AMD EBGIMEERIMB
Although the Department of Defense plays an important role in the
formulation of disarmament policy, its aost striking contribution to
disarmament is in technical research. The extent of this contribution
is examined in the following chapter, "Arms Control and Research.*1 The
Director of Defense Research and Engineering performs the following
functions applicable to disarmament aatterst
. . • supervises all research and engineering activities in
the Department of Defense • • • directs and supervises the
activities of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (AKPk) • • •
consults vith the Joint Chiefs of Staff on interaction of re-
search and development and strategy • • . coordinates activities,
as appropriate, vith other agencies of the Department of Defense;
and aaintains liaison with appropriate research and development
agencies outside of the Department of Defense*2
In matters pertaining to disarmament, the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering performs a staff function of research coordina-
tion for DOD. Within the Department of Defense, the agency it calls
upon most frequently for technical support of disarmament projects is the
Advanced Research Projects Agency.
VI. THE ADVAHCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGE8CY
The Advanced Research Projects Agency is organised within the
Department of Defense to conduct research for the Secretary of Defense.
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The Agency is separate from the military services, but closely coordi-
nated with them. The Agency ist
• • . responsible for basic and applied research and develop-
ment for such advanced projects as the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering assigns. The Agency utilizes the services
of the ailitary departments, other government agencies, private
industrial and public entities, individuals and educational or
research institutions to perform its projects .3
Prior to 1959, the priaary responsibility of AKPft. was the mili-
tary space program. When the responsibility for roject Vela was
assigned to AREA in that year, the military space programs were trans-
ferred to the military service departments. Project Vela is discussed
in the following chapter* Under the supervision of the Director of
Defense research and Engineering, XBPk works very closely with the
Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (31ASA), and coordinates the activities of several private
research institutions.
Despite the man/ criticisms of "Pentagoaese" and stereotype
characterizations of sterile military thought, there is no single
dominant disarmament philosophy in the Department of Defense. From the
practical standpoint, there are too many divergent interests within DOD
for a theoretical position to encompass all the views on any one issue.
The DOD has, since World War IX, spread far beyond the confines of the
military services to represent economists, scientists, and non-military
strategists. The military establishment can effectively speak as one
voice only through the Secretary of Defense.
3Ibid., p. o.
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No new agency can assume the technical and scientific disarma-
sent research functions now carried by the Department of Defense. What
is required is political leadership of the military research effort.
This leadership oust ultimate ly come from the White House, but the day-
to-day policy guidance and initiative should originate with those who
are close to the foreign policy-making process in the Department of
State. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has the oppor-
tunity to fulfill this function. Close collaboration between the
Weapons ^valuation and Control Office and the Disarmament Advisory Staff
in ACDA, and the arms control specialists in the Department of Defense,
should alleviate many of the past shortcomings
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CHAPT^ VII
ARMS OOBTflOL AJID
This paper has attempted to indicate the fundamental shift in
philosophy from that of disarmament, as historically conceived, to that
of anas control. Modern arms control systems , seeking primarily to
stabilize the international turmoil and to establish international in-
spection and control, should be realised as only a first step toward
general and complete disarmament. Disarmament in the past has not
usually been considered dependent upon a system of international inspec-
tion and verification, but most modern ar«is control schemes, to be
effective, require an elaborate inspection system* There are many
reasons for this, but essentially the emphasis on arms control and in-
spection results from the present international political situation and
the amazing development of military science in the last twenty years.
An effective system of inspection compensates for the extreme
reluctance of either of the two political "blocs" to disarm without
effective safeguards, under the present conditions of international
tension. It is intended, therefore, through a method of arms control,
not necessarily to disarm but to superimpose an elaborate systea of
Inspection upon the present international structure. Thus, the prin-
cipal efforts of recent years, although not successful, have been
directed toward what was once felt to be the area of most likely agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and the Western powers: supervision of a
ban on tests of nuclear devices. The limited applicability (within the
true tease of disarmament) of these efforts, however worthwhil , should
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be fully understood, A successful ban on nuclear tests is at the fringe
of the disarmament issue. £ven the more comprehensive arms control
proposals do not adequately come to grips with the momentous political
problem of what to do in the event of failure of the principal parties
to uphold the system.
It was suggested earlier that aost technical problems are even-
tually superseded by the larger political issues. This should not imply
that technical problems are either minor or simple to solve. Any study
of the research problems involved in an attempt to improve detection and
identification devices for the control system of a test ban would dispel
such a thought. But the essential fact still remains t the resolution
of a technical problem does not in any vay guarantee resolution of the
political problem surrounding it.
This chapter deals primarily with some of the research endeavors
in the United States currently being devoted to developing a system for
the monitoring and control of a nuclear test ban treaty. Such research
is complicated and expensive; despite some statements regarding the
capabilities of the new Agency in the Department of State, it will not
have research facilities of the magnitude of those now available in the
Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, and it would be
unrealistic to attempt to provide such facilities. 1
J>The bill to establish a United states Disarmament Agency for
iforld Peace and security said the following about the research facili-
ties of the Agency (Section 32) s HThe Director is authorized (1) to
conduct and support research, development, and other studies of the
types specified in the prececding section through use of the Agency*
s
own facilities, and (2) to use, with their consent, the facilities of
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Because of the emphasis on control rather than the reduction of
eras, there has been an extensive increase in the quantity of scientific
research in the United States devoted to these measures, especially a
test ban monitoring system. These endeavors include many sections of
the executive branch that would not normally be considered as having a
role in disarmament matters.
It has often been alleged that the negotiating positions of the
United States Government prior to disarmament conferences have been
inadequately prepared. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these hasty
efforts was the U. S. position before the Conference of Experts in 1958
regarding the capability to detect and identify nuclear explosions.
When the government was forced to revise its position in early 1959
because of the data received from the Hardtack II test, it became ob-
vious that an extensive research program was required in order to
determine just what was the expected capability for detecting and iden-
tifying nuclear tests. As a result, two panels were formed to study the
problem and report to the President's Special Assistant for Science and
Technology. This marked the beginning of a new disarmament era in the
United States Governments the ere of intensified research effort into
the technical problems of arms control. Perhaps the creation of the new
other Government agencies or those of outside organisations. In carrying
out his responsibilities under this Act the Director shall, to the extent
feasible, make full use of available facilities, Government and private,
and may construct such new laboratories as he deems necessary. United
States Congress, House of Representatives, A Sill to establish a United
States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security , H.fi. V936, b7th
Congress, 1st Session, June 29, 19ol, pp. b-9$ hereafter cited as A Bill
to Establish a Disarmament Agency .
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disarmament agency will aarK the beginning of a second era, the era of
intensified research effort into the political probleas of arias control.
The first of these two panels, which was officially known as the
Panel on seismic iaproveaent and which had been formed by the special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology at the request of
the Department of State, produced a report on "The Seed for Fundamental
Research in seismology." One of Its basic recommendations was for
w
. . . a broad program to find ways for inprovinr; the detectability of
seismic waves from explosions and earthquakes."*
The second panel, the Panel on High Altitude Detection, was given
the responsibility to study methods of detection and identification of
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in space. The reports from
both panels were received by the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology in March, 19!>9. Although the Department of State
had been instrumental in the formation of these panels, because it
lacked research facilities it played little part in the development of
what became known as Project Vela .3
-United states Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Tech-
nical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons
test Ban, Appendixes to Hearings Before the Special"§uEcommittee on
Radiation and the subcommittee on Research and Development, 66th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, Part 2 of 2 Parts, April 19, 20, 21, and 22, I960
(Washington! Government Printing Office, I960), p. 652$ hereafter cited
** Technical Aspects of Detection .
^United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Developments jn the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear
Explosions TPfoJecE Vela ) and Relationship to Test Ban KegoElations ,'
Hearings,""67th Congress, lsT"~c>3i;>P, July *2"£,"~2T7 ^7 1901 (Washington!
Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 9} hereafter cited as Developments
in Detection and Identification.
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The reports of these panels were widely studied and discussed
within the government.** The story of the development of Project Vela
from what appeared to be a modest beginnin i described by the
testimony of Mr. Carlton M. Beyer, Deputy Assistant Director, Nuclear
Tast Detection Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency, before the
Joint Committee on Atomic energy
t
The assignment of the Vela Project to the Department of
Defense (DOD) resulted from a meeting on April 23, 1959 during
which Dr. Killian, jpeciai Assistant to the President on Science
and Technology, Chairman HcCone of the Atomic Energy Commission
and Deputy Secretary of Defense Queries discussed the implementa-
tion of the reports from Panels on High Altitude Detection and
Seismic Improvement. At this meeting, it was agreed that—
(a) The specific recommendations of both panels would be
implemented.
(b) The DOD would accept overall responsibility for imple-
menting the high altitude panel recommendations with support
from the Atomic Energy Commission (ALC) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
(c) The DOD would accept primary responsibility for imple-
menting the recommendations of the Seismic Improvement Panel but
that the AJC would implement the nuclear and HE explosions in
cooperation with the DOD.
After a number of studies including those by advisory groups
and activities within the DOD, the Secretary of Defense assigned
the responsibility for the project, later named Vela, to the
Advanced Research Projects Agency. The assignment is to
"Perform research, experimentation and systems development to
obtain at the earliest practicable date a system for the detec-
tion of nuclear explosions both underground and &t high altitude.*
This assigrjsent includes the following major technical
objectives!
(a) Conduct research to better understand the nature of the
nuclear detonation signals to be detected and how to discriminate
them from other signals.
^See the testimony of Mr. Carlton M. Beyer of the Department of
Defense, Technical Aspects of Detection
, p. 383.
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(b) Develop and evaluate existing and new techniques and
instruments for detecting and identifying nuclear detonation
signals*
(c) Develop and evaluate systems for improving the detection
and identification of nuclear detonations, and the problems
involved in the operation of these systems*
(d) Perform research, development, and evaluation of onsite
Inspection techniques.?
This list of major technical objectives gives some indication of
the scope of Project Vela, which soon involved the participation of
several governmental agencies, as veil as many private universities,
colleges, and research organisations. The magnitude and importance of
the role played by non-governmental agencies involved in the research
activities of Project Vela—as well as other projects in the field of
arms control—• is significant and worthy of separate study.
Project Vela was separated into three individual projects. Vela
UWFORM, Vela SIERRA, and Vela HOTSu. Vela UBIFDRH is concerned with the
detection and identification of underground and underwater nuclear ex-
plosions, and SIERRA and ttflcL are devoted to the detection of nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere or in space. Vela SIERRA concerns ground-
based equipment, and Vela HDTSL Is involved with the detection of
explosions in space by satellites.
The three basic projects (UMIFORK, SIERRA, and HDTfiL) were further
separated into many subdivisions in order to utilize existing facilities
and to reduce the length of time required for Project Vela. Responsi-
bility for the various segments was then "farmed out 1 ' to individual
^Developments in Detection and Identification, p. 56. For
additional treatment o? the many 'agencies and organizations (including
organisational charts) participating in Project Vela, see pp. 57*66.
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agencies which either conducted the research or contracted with private
organizations. The resulting framework of this research organization,
all under the general supervision of the Advanced Research Projects
Agency of the Department of Defense, was concisely described by Mr.
Beyers
Regular guidance is received from the Office el the Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and certain
aspects of the Vela Project have i>»9n reviewed by the President*
3
Scientific Advisory Committee. The U.S. Disarmament Administra-
tion in the Department of State has been kept informed of progress
on the project through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, by direct contact with
ARPA and by direct contact with agents working on the project.
The Atomic Energy Commission is active in ail three programs
of the Vela Project .... Within the Department of the Interior,
the Geological Survey is participating through an increased
erustal study program and is aiding in the planned series of
research explosions • • • • The Department of Commerce, through
the Coast and Geodetic survey, is one of the numerous agencies
assisting in the coordinated program of extensive measurements
to be made in connection with the explosion program.
The National Bureau of Standards gives major support in the
Vela SIEHRA Program. The national Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration is participating in the joint A«C, NASA and DOD plan-
ning effort under the Vela lt)TcL Program.
This description, which includes only a portion of the govern-
mental and private institutions engaged in Project Vela, demonstrates
the magnitude of the research effort involved. The scope of the
activity of private organisations should be emphasized; since there has
been no central organization that could undertake by itself such a
massive project, it has been necessary to spread the effort throughout
^Developments Jji Detection and Identification, p. £7.
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the educational and industrial communities as well as the government.
For the entire project there have been veil over one hundred separate
contracts with university and industrial research centers, and under
Vela U2HF0H& alone, $80 million of the $92 million planned «. . . is to
be attributed to industry and university activity."? Financially,
Project Vela dwarfs the estimated cost of operating the (then) proposed
Disarmament Agency for one year. 3 it is not sound to conclude from a
comparison of operating costs that one program is mere valuable than
another, or that technical research excludes political research, but it
is an indication of the extent to which the government has become com-
mitted to the concept of elaborate inspection and control systems.
Obviously, Project Vela is a gigantic scientific research enter-
prise. Its limited applicability to disarmament in the conventional
sense should be underscored. Project Vela is not designed to disarm the
United states or the Soviet Union, or both. Its purpose is to study the
feasibility of the detection of nuclear explosions in various media and
under various conditions, in order to assist the United States Government
in the preparation of its positions in the test ban negotiations.
It should also be emphasized that Project Vela is thoroughly
grounded upon an extensive system of international inspection, although
the results of the project may eventually permit the sice and scope of
the system to be reduced. International inspection systems have been
7Ibid
., p. 60.
^Roughly estimated at $6 million for the first year, including
administrative and research expenditures. See Report on S. 2180
, p. 7.
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anathema to the Soviets. The United states program to develop a techni-
cal inspectorate appears to k t unilateral effort , not matched by a
known similar program In the Soviet Union. This matter was briefly
raised during the hearings on Project Vela*
Representative Yam zandt .... Do you know of any contribu-
tion in the way of Knowledge that the Russians have made to the
development of a program, with limited capabilities, of detecting
tests # such as we have from some of our projects?
Dr. Latter. I know of nothing directly, no, sir. The discus*
sions which we have with the Soviets in Geneva have not suggest
that they have made a great effort to learn about detection.
Tt*y certainly are, many of them, excellent scientists and very
knowledgeable in their respective fields.
Representative Van Zandt. Is it proper to say that by their
attitude they indicate they are not interested?
Dr. Latter. Certainly. I mean there is every indication
that the Soviets are minimizing the importance of control. 1
thin* this is a feeling I had consistently from the time of
the experts until today. 9
Considering the limited disarmament applicability of the project,
and the past hostility evidenced by the Soviets to international inspec-
tion and their apparent lack of interest in this type of research
endeavor, it appears unusual that the orientation and emphasis of the
disarmament research of the united states Government has not been more
closely scrutinized. It is pertinent to question whether the decision to
place overwhelming concentration of effort in the scientific aspects of
arms control research has been a deliberate, conscious decision, or
whether the United states has inadvertently chosen this line of research
without careful consideration of other priorities that might be involved.
^Developments JLn Detection and Identification, p. 27.
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This writer is not competent to criticize the technical quality or the
extent of present research for a aystea of international control*
Undoubtedly, these programs should be continued on their present scales,
every possible avenue to international stability should be explored,
including a test ban treaty, nevertheless, the government should com-
plement this research with siailar effort in the legal, economic, and
political fields.




establishment of the arms control and disarhament agency
For fifteen years after World War II the formulation of arms
control policy was hampered by excessive decentralization and limited
research support. Had disarmament been recognised in the government as
a vital international issue rather than an irritant that vas only reluc-
tantly faced, these deficiencies might sooner have been overcome. Not
all of the organisational problems could be eliminated, of course, but
a degree of centralization combined with a thorough research program was
indicated by the rather haphasara negotiations of the early and mid-
1950' s. It was not until 19*60* however, that the disarmament personnel
and functions within the office of the Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary 01 State for Disarmament and Atomic energy were transferred to a
new unit called the U.S. Disarmament Administration. The establishment
of the Disarmament Administration emphasised the recognition thatt (1)
disarmament policy requires extensive, continuing research not confined
to the technical facilities of the DOD or the AEC; and (2) arms control
policy, as an integral part of foreign policy, belongs under the direc-
tion and responsibility of the Secretary of State.
It soon became apparent, however, that the problems involved in
making disarmament policy extended beyond any one agency of the govern-
ment. Coordination of research efforts by a section within the Debar-
ment of ;tate was a noteworthy improvement , but the making of arms
control policy required an organisation that possessed more prestige
within the Executive Branch than a subsidiary unit in the Department of
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State* :bw to provide this prestige without creating an administrative
"nightmare" was the dilemma that confronted the aeakeij or the Congress
and officials in the Executive Branch vho were attempting, in 1961. to
write the legislation that would establish the Oisaraaaent Agency for
World Peace and Security.
The Agency proposed to the Congress represented the realisation
that disarmament can no longer be treated as an ad hoc affair* There
ast he an infusion of the thinking of all the departments concerned so
that the cany ramifications of disarmament policy can be dealt with at
all levels of planning. Above all, considerably greater effort should
now be devoted to the basic political, legal, and economic problems of
disarmament and arms control that had previously been rather neglected*
The proposal for the Disarmament Agency recognized a few of the
inadequacies of past efforts* There was to be more emphasis on the
exchange of career personnel among the departments, with ample represen-
tation of other sections of the government on the Agency staff. Action
Ul (c) authorized the Director of the Agency tot
• . * enter into agreements with other Government agencies,
including the military departments through the Secretary of
Defense, under which officers or employees of such agencies
ay be detailed to the Agency for the performance of service
pursuant to this Act without prejudice to the status or ad-
it of such officers or employees within their own
agencies » • « •*
This was not an innovation or departure from past practices, but
rather a recognition that the exchange of personnel has been beneficial
should be Increased* It should be realised that the exchange of
l
t Bill to Establish a Disarmament Agency , p. 12,
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personnel among the Agencies In no way reduces the amount of cooperation
and coordination required among agencies in the government. Career
personnel attached to another agency for a regular tour are not repre-
sentatives (officially) of their parent organization, but instead offer
technical expertise peculiar to their profession so that policy papers
may be more adequately prepared at all levels*
In an attempt to coordinate disarmament policy with military
policy at am earlier stage in its development, Section hi (f) of the
proposed bill authorises the Director to etuploy three retired military
commissioned officers who are experts in military strategy or weapons
systems*
Another past deficiency has been the quantity, quality, and con-
tinuity of research for disarmament. The extent of present efforts in
the technical area of disarmament has been indicated in Chapter VII.
One of the purposes of tktf paper has been to demonstrate the need* not
to decrease our present technical research, but to devote more attention
to the basic political and economic issues*
The Director of the proposed Agency would have ample discretion
in establishing his internal organization, but the nature of the re-
search and studies to be conducted or coordinated by the Agency is
clearly defined in section 31* Research was not to be considered
limited to those subjects listed* Although relative importance of the
research subjects is not indicated in the Act, it Is significant to note
that many of the highly important subjects that in the past have re-
ceived scanty attention are lumped together in the next to last research
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(1) the scientific, economic, political, legal, social,
psychological, military, and technological factors related
to the prevention of war with a view to a better understand-
ing of how the basic structure of a lasting peace may be
established.
Another research area that recuir vuentrat ion of effort 1st
(j) the national security and foreign policy implications of
disarmament proposals with a view to a better understanding of
the effect of such proposals upon national security and foreign
policy;
Too often in the past, our disarmament and national security
policies have bezn at odds.2 This is a problem that calls for mare than
simply coordination of departmental activitie .
A third area of past disarmament r. calling for remedy is
that of public opinion. Section 35 of the Act describes public informa-
tion as a function to be performed by the Director "with respect to the
dissemination abroad of information concerning United States disarmament
activities." This is presently being effected through the cooperation
of the United States Information Agency and the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency. It is sxtreaely difficult to measure the impact or
success of such a program, but its need is generally accepted.
Not emphasised, however, was the need to increase the amount of
information presented to the American people through the various media.
In the past, disarmament may have been a relatively simple operation to
effect if political agreement could be achieved. Today, the combination
of the issues of national security and arris control and the related
2senator Humphrey cites two examples of this divergency of policy
in "Government Organization for Arms uontrol, 1 ' Donald G. Brennan (ed.),
Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (Mew York: George
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political problems is too complicated to call for a staple "yes" or "no"
public response.'' Effective propaganda both at home and abroad on
disarmament issues requires a prior formulation of basic goals, houever,
and U.r. organisational ability to determine these goals has been
limited.
Cooperation and coordination with other governmental agencies has
already been discussed in tejMi of exchange of personnel, and the need
for increased coordination of disarmament twl military policies has been
noted. In several places the Act provides for and requires intensified
effort on the part of the Director of the Disarmament Agency to establish
ore effective coordination, not only in policy formation but in
search and other functions. In Section 31 the Director iss
. . . authorized and directed to coordinate the research,
development, and other studies conducted in this field by or
for other Government agencies in accordance with procedures
established under Section 37 ...
,
nhich directs the Agency Btre«*4Hr to«
. . . develop suitable procedures to assure cooperation,
coordination, and a continuing exchange of information among
affected Government agencies on all significant aspects of
United States disarmament policy and related matters . . .
-'For an illuminating discussion of this subject, see Ithiel dm
Sola Pool, "Public Opinion and the Control of Armaments," Brennan, on.
cit., pp. 333-3^6. Sir. Pool is a strtr of arms control vice
disarmament, in the conventional sense. 1-fe is critical of U.S. accept-
ance of Soviet terminology znd criteria, such as "peaceful cooexistance,*
"reduced tensions" resulting from disarmament, and other similar con-
cepts, and Pool calls instead for the education of the American people
of the need for, and the cost of, arms control. He also suggests a
propaganda drive for arms control "to open up Soviet society," stressing
the role that public opinior >?.ays even in the Soviet Union.
.ie "»»x" »MMlt «*: it«a cj Lvsoilxpo? o*4 ft! MM
mad riid tJ *>o MM*!* saUn aJtb ©
Jm*Jm)I
tft c»ia*;»^Jf iAJttMVtltVoe " ->'* lMMMMMM brt»
... UWCIM] M MjMMM M HWJ •! bMMMttlfe nttttf 0**tfi
.... fc. *:,ioiiOq fW^lii-. ' : •' fclMM'Ullfe ll M>J*Mrticoa .•b,:fi?iDrt! lol















«MJ*MMfc • n«mfl Ti IrMMM) Mil iMi£ •!«)»/ '& *
-4«w* . .»w»t ifiwlintw;
-no - u f i .h r ? iTtffn mm «J<M*MBM»*b mo
•Xcaac mliaa* *U lb
I »*«MMM ttli * .J.<-iJMMj MM tli *MM MU MM < -' *•* MlJ ..•
115
The new Disarmament Agency is not visualized as a superbureauc-
racy, although aost governmental agencies have an inherent ability to
flourish. If the Agency is compared with our disarmament efforts of
just a few years ago, when only a handful of full-time personnel ex-
pended annually a mere few hundred thousand dollars, the proposed Agency
takes on added depth. The staff of the present Disarmament Administra-
tion has estimated thatj
... a new agency would require approximately 250 people in
the first year, including all the categories of personnel already
described as well as administrative staff for such services as
the new Agency would provide for itself. Host of the Agency's
administrative services will be supplied by the State Department.
The Agency would require approximately 3 million dollars annually
for salaries and administrative services.
At the beginning, the Agency should contract out much of its
scientific research work. If it acquired laboratory facilities
of its own, however, additional personnel would of course, be
necessary. An estimate of the funds which will be necessary for
research, study and other contract authority for the first year
is $3 million. Developments in the field of negotiations,
however, may drastically change even the most careful estimate.**
It is expected that the Agency would be organized internally like
the present Disarmament Administration modified in accordance with the
desires of the Director and his immediate staff. Only an Office of
Public Affairs and an Office of the General Counsel would be established
by statute (Sec. 25), The responsibilities of the Director for conduct-
ing research and establishing research facilities have been mentioned.
The Director is responsible for preparing recommended United icates
^Appendix C to Report on S. 2160 , Creating a United States
SlaarfAaaent Agency for World Peace and Security
,
/ri.d./ p. 7, prepared
by the Off ice of the Adviser to the President on Disarmament.
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disarmament poiicy . . • for the President, the Secretary of State,
and the heads of suck other Governaent agencies as the President aay
determine • • • " (Sec. 33) • Authorisation is provided in Section }h for
the Director, under the direction of the secretary of State, to
consult and communicate with or direct the consultation and
communication with representatives of other nations or of inter-
national organizations for the purpose of conducting negotiations
concerning disarmament ©r for the purpose of exercising any other
authority given to the Director by this Act; and (b) comsuniea
in the naae of the Secretary with diplomatic representatives of the
United states in this country and abro
One of the more significant provisions of the Act (Sec. 26) is
the establishment of a General Advisory Committee (modeled after a
similar organization at the Atomic finergy Commission) . . • to advise
the Director on disarmament policy and activities," The Committee, with
a maximum of fifteen members, would be appointed ksy the President and
would be constituted, it appears, on an ad hoc basis for the individual
ambers, or consultants. These consultants would be reimbursed for
their services at $100 per diem, plus travel expenses, "while away from
their homes or regular places of business •' Their contracts «ey be
renewed annually.
If such a body were permanently constituted on a full-time basis,
with representation afforded to the economic, legal, military, and other
interested communities, the Advisory Committee might become the organisa-
tion capable of formulating the basic disarmament objectives upon which
policy and negotiating positions can be baaed. Under the proposed
circumstances, the General Advisory Committee would probably tend to
become another "panel of experts" adept at producing vague generalities,
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Hearingr an the proposed Disarmament Agency were conducted by the
oaimlttee on Foreign Relations ana trie .louse Committee on
Fc reign Affairs in August, 1961. A ci toe testimony taken at
these hearings results in several conclusions, some of which are en-
couraging lor the future of U.S. disarmament negotiations and others
that are not so encouraging.
Host oi the favorable results nay be condensed into two basic
conclusions: (l) uisariiaoient, because it is so higiuy complex, requires
an enormous amount of research (research effort in recent years is now
recognized as having been somewhat superficial, hastily- conceived, and
excessively concentrated on technical problems }} and (2) disarmament
policy is a part of foreign policy, and the Director of the proposed
Agency should cowe under the immediate direction of t\- etary of
nte, but in order to have individual 3tature, the Director must have
ultimate access to the Pi trident.
A preponderance of witnesses testified in support of these
favorable conclusions chat may seem almost self-evident now, yet have
not received sufficient recognition in the past.
heartening, however, was the lack of testimony bearing upon
two other vital areas
t
1. The netd for a group, commits >;, or section within the Agency
composed of highly qualified, senior officials who can address themselves
full time to the difficult political profciems of disarmament.
2. The need for an interdepartmental group that can bring the
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with State to bear on these problems. This must be iaore than a coordi-
nating body to be effective.
These four issues require some clarification. Host witnesses
testified strongly regarding the pressing need for extensive research.
There was little dissension from this point of view. Most often, re-
search was considered necessary in technical areas to support disarmament
delegations, so that they could be better prepared in their negotiations.
Few persons are better qualified to testify regarding this need for
thorough advance preparation in support of negotiations than Frederick M.
Eaton, wao headed the \J,S. delegation in the Ten-Nation Disarmament
negotiations!
Too much stress cannot be placed on the importance of research
and studies in the area of disarmament. A year ago, and I doubt
that the situation has changed today, the lack of adequate backup
papers to support our positions was one of our greatest failing.
Their absence leaves any U.S. delegation in a very insecure and
uncertain position. Although in every disarmament plan advanced
over the past 10 years we have proposed a gradual reduction of
arms, we have never had an acceptable program as to what weapons
should be scrapped, let alone an agreement with our allies in
thi3 area. The same failure exists as to the definition of what
constitutes forces to be reduced. We have never had adequate
support papers on our proposal for the monitoring of weapons in
outer space, the launching of missiles, the monitoring of the
production of plants producing fissionable materials, although
we have strenuously advanced the position that we would be will-
ing to stop production of fissionable materials for military
purposes. I use these only as examples of the necessity of
giving to this Agency the authority to direct and coordinate
studies ana research in these areas, and where necessary, I
conduct such on its own.-*
%nited States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Disaraau^ent Agency , Hearings on S. 2180, A Bill to Establish a United
States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, 87th Congress,
1st Session, August lit, 15, and 16, l°6l (Washington: Government









In his statements before the Senate and iffcuse Committees, John J.
KcCloy included siailar comments on the need lor research, ttowevtr,
Hr. McCloy was more specific than most other witnesses on the subject
of additional research on political questions. After noting the con-
tinued need for research on technical questions , he stressed the re-
quirement for thorough study of the ". . . basic political questions
concerning the maintenance of peace and security under various levels of
disarmamei. Perhaps thi3 Indicates an increased effort In the future
to study these vital political questions that have been rather lightly
treated in the past.
There was doubt regarding the organisational structure for this
research endeavor , a fear that the intensive research activities of
other agencies such as ODD and the JUG would merely be duplicated in the
new Agency. There also was the anticipation that the research activi-
ties of the proposed Agency would replace those currently conducted by
other departments* This misunderstanding is best exemplified by an
exchange between two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
during hearings.
Mr. Zablocki .... Do you know. Mr. Chairman, that the White
House has a Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament with
nine staff members.
The State Department in the U.S. Disarmament Administration has
52 personnel and the Science Adviser to the Secretary has 12.
The national Security Council has 2i*. The Department of Defense
has & special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Arms
Control, who has 12. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Security Affairs and Assistant Secretary for International
6Ibid., p. 65.
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Security are two more. The Director for Disarmament, Department
of Defense, has seven. The Advanced Research Projects Agency has
16. The Atonic Energy Commission has 1% for a total of 330.
The Disarmament Agency is not a new venture and an initial
step in disarmament. My constituents are questioning whether
this agency is really going to consolidate, coordinate, or
duplicate. . . .
Mr. Hays. • . . that is exactly what the bill proposes to do,
is get all these people together under one agency so we can know
whet they are doing.
Mr. Zablockl. On the contrary, it does not.'
This writer vould have to agree with Mr. Zablocki that research
would not be gathered under one agency. The transfer of research
facilities from Defense and Atomic Energy to the new Agency to conduct
tests for detection, for example, would entail tremendous expenditures,
as would the transfer of space control research from the NASA, as
another example. A much more reasonable solution would be to conduct
joint theoretical research with the other department concerned perforat-
ing the tests under the supervision of the Agency.
There was little comment on section hi of the proposed bill
(Presidential authority to transfer certain functions). For these
certain functions to be transferred from any government agency to the
Disarmament Agency, they must relate primarily to disarmament. After
7
'United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency
,
Hearings on H.R. 7936 and H.R.""911tt, b7th Congress, 1st Session, August
2ii, 25, 26, and September 7, l?6l (Washington: Government Printing Of-
fice, 1961), p. 58. This report is hereafter cited as House Hearings
on Arms Control Agency . Also 3ee this report, pp. 3^-36, for the
testimony of Commissioner Leland J. Haworth of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission on the possibility of research duplication.
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questioning the wording of this section, former Secretary of Defense
Thomas .,. dttM, Jr., added that
The word "function" is very broad, and I think it would be
more satisfactory to have the transfer authority follow the
nonaal Executive order procedure.
The secona basic conclusion mentioned earlier concerned the
recognition that the Director of the Disarmament Agency should be under
the direction of the Secretary of State, yet have access to the Presi-
dent. There was considerable comment on this "dual allegiance" concept,
especially in the Senate hearings, and on the means available to provide
coordination under this new system.
From the organizational standpoint, having the Director in this
position is not advantageous. Senator Symington stated this concisely,
when questioning Secretary Ruskj
How can a man be under the direction of the Secretary and, at
the 3ame time, under the direction of the President?
Secretary Rusk. (After discussing the peculiar needs of
disarmament) ... I do not believe that it would be proper to
say that any officer of the Government who reports to a Cabinet
officer and to the President is reporting to two hats because
the Cabinet officer reports to the President, and this is a
matter of insuring that proposals in this important field have
the full examination of the Secretary of State. 9
Obviously not satisfied, Senator Symington continued:
I ask., with great respect, would the tttftd of this new Agency
report to you, or does he report to the President?
Secretary Rusk .... To the Secretary of State and the
President. I do not think, sir, I can give you another answer
because that is the proposal. 10
"senate Hearings on Disarmament Agency
, od. cit ., p. lUi.















Hot only was the relationship of the Director to the Secretary of
State a matter of confusion, but the problem oi interdepartmental coor-
dination wa.3 left largely unanswered. There was occasional mention of
the functions of the Committee of Principals^ and the National Security
IP
Council, but no thorough discussion of this issue.
The absence in the hearings of extensive testimony on the pro-
posed methods of formulating disarmament policy has been mentions.:. The
need for a new approach to the political problems of disarmament also
«•• been treated previously. Broad political policy should be formu-
lated in the new Agency, vith the active participation of other agencies
in each stage. The General Advisory Committee could perform this func-
tion in the Agency if it were a permanent structure, and the Committee
of Principals could serve as the Interdepartmental group to formulate
basic disarmament policy, but such functions were not spelled out in the
proposed bill or in the testimony received. This unresolved problem was
lucidly presented in the testimony of Comaiss loner ttnrorthi
*
^Senate Hear inao on Disarmament Agency , op. cit., pp. 31, 79~60 f
and v«i. There was little agreement on "the functions""©? the Committee of
Principals. Commissioner Leland J. Kaworth of the Atomic energy Com*
mission noted (p. /2) that •« . . .As you know the present policy-
formation process involves a committee of the heads of affected agen-
cies—the Gom&itU.*, of Principals—-that meets under the leadership of
State to discuss and arrive at a consensus on policy measures. We hope
the provisions of this bill will be interpreted to provide for some such
continuing participation in policy formation at all levels by affected
am. responsible agencies, vith the U.S. Disarmament Agency as the central
coordinating policy group." Most references to the Committee of Princi-
pals, however, do not attribute policy making to that body. Ar. McCloy
had previously cemaented (p. 60) that "It is only when you have a dif-
ference of view, when you have a situation where you have to compose
varying points of view that you call in the Committee of Principals."
12>ee Ibid., pp. 76-78, for testimony of general Lemnitser on the
»• • •
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X should lite to speak briefly about the proems of making
policy on disarmament within the administration. The importar>
policy decisions must, of cjFjjrse, be made by the Pre la
makin .uons he ;-iust act on the basis of various,
soa«tia«s conflicting, considerations of a technical, political,
ana national security nature. It is clearly necessary that there
be soae central group working purposefully in the development of
policy recommendations, but other agencies have special agrees
of competence in various areas bearing on Jisarmament. An 1
portant . Ion of the bill is that such agencies be brought
into policy formatica at stages. 13
The Disarmament Agency proposed in 19&1 presented a vast improve-
ment in the conduct and coordination cf technical research, but at the
same time failed to provide a vehicle for ..solution of basic
political questions. The practices and attitudes of the President H
his principal advisers, which in the long run are of xoich more importance
than organirational structure, could overcome this deficiency.
There is no significant difference between the proposed bii
the Act establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency In the
successful legislation, Congress indicated its hesitancy to accept the
priority of disarmament over anas control by revising the entire bill,
in j.u lag the title ti the Agency, so that arsis control received preced-
mm.*
anticipated role of the National Security Council in future disarmament
matters.
tarings on Arms Control Agency
, pp. 3u-
^Public Law 87
: 2g7, 753tat.631 (1961).
Ejection yj of the Act grants the Director authority to prepare
arms control policy re commendations for the President, Secretary of
te, and others, but Congress retained its voice in ultimate arms con-
trol decisions ny requiring that any arms control agreements with other
countries be submitted to the Congress according to the "... treaty
.ltd n&w. <M *;
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The unusual, dual responsibility of the Director of the Aras
Control Md ^isaraament Agency <e President as well as the
Secretary of State was retained in the Act. The Director is responsible
(Section 2) to th. ident, the secretary of State, other Members of
the Executive Branch, and Congress for oisamaaent and arms contr>
policy recoaaanoations, and an evaluat; the t£fect of these recoift*
aendatlons on foreign policy, national security policy, and the economy.
Sections 22 and 33 designate the Director as the pr
ana disarmament adviser to the President and MM ..tary of State.
Section 22 also grants the Director priaary responsibility wi thin the
aovernaent (italics supplied) for aras control and dlsaraammt natters.
Tbe Director of the Agency also is responsible to the Secretary of State
for the internal organisation of the Agency (Section 25) and for arns
control negotiations and related functions (section 31). These are
aatters that pertain primarily to the work of the Department of State.
One reason for the establishment of the ACDA was to create an
agency with a certain aaount of independence and prestige. Sincere,
astute negotiations for disaraa&ent—bas*d upon thorough research and
preparation of negotiating positions—can briny international prestige
to the United States and the Agency. Prestige of a different nature has
also been consiaered a requisite for the new Agency, and that is doaestic
prestige result int.) froa the priaary position of the Agency in the
ailing power of the President und istitution or unless authorised
by further affirjsative legislation by the Congress of the United states."
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government for the consideration of ontrol natters. In its coor-
dination of the disarmament programs wit rnwental organiza-
tion, the Agency aust have prL&ary authority if it is to be effective.
For thi3 ;, at least in part, the .or was aade responsible to
the President areas. For exaopie, under Section 35 the President is
asked to establish procedures for the coordination of the several agen-
cies of the Executive Branch, ana is requested to resolve any diff;
that aay arise between the governments. Bias* In addition, the
President is author izec to transfer the disarmament activities of other
agencies to the Ar&s Control and Disarmament Agency.
The bill establishing the ACfiA. specified a portion of the organi-
zational structure of the Agency, in aadition to the Director, the
Congress provided for a Deputy Director (Section 23) and a taaxiauat
four Assistant Directors (Section 9k) to be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice ana consent of the Senate. A General Advisory
Committee was established by the statute, which required the Coaaittee
to aeet at least twice iach year (Section 26). The lower echelons of
organization were left to discretion of the Director, under the dir
tion of the Secretary of State, except for an Office of the General
Counsel. This last position would be responsible for the legal replica-
tions of an arcs control treaty, as well as other functions.
In sec c« with the authority to set up the internal organisa-
tion of the Arjency, several bureaus ana divisions have been formed. The
Public Affairs Advisor, the Secretariat, and the Sxecutive Staff are
s«If- explanatory. Research in the A^DA is provided by five offices, or
bureaus. The Reference Research Staff conducts historical research and
m
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provides the required referent .he other offices and
activities of the Agency. Personnel tivt fnanagement services are handled
ay th
The remaining research activities inclo
International Helati -ith conducting
political research, developing negotiating positions in coor-
atlon with the other offices of che Agency, and supply
support personnel for International negotiations*
canonic Office—'responsible for the economic research
related to arms control and disarmament Pleasures.
;ience an -oology office—Provides the sclent if.
research required to support the formulation of policy,
(L) Weapons ^valuation and Control Office— researches the
;ect of weapons systems and employment of forces upon int.:
national stability.
The Key unit for the research and pol icy-making activities of the
Agency is the Disarmament Advisory .staff. This Is probably the most
important section of the Agency, other than the top echelon. The Dis-
armament Advisory Staff (DAS) is responsible for the formulation of
disarmament policy recommendations. froa the research produced
by the four research offices Just discussed. The DAS coordinates not
only the internal functioning of the Agency but also ". . . maintains
liaison with the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State and
with other Government agencies concerned with disarmament in order to
establish agreed arm: control ana disarmament positions."*' Also, the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Organisation
and Functions /n. \J, p. 2.
^Ibjd., p. 2. For an additional view of the early organisa-
tional structure of the ACDA> see U rtgress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, First Annual Report of the U.S. Arms
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DAS consults with the General Advisory Coraaittee during the process
disaroaaent and arms control policy formulation.
Control and Disanaaasnt Agency , 67th Congress, I si on, jocuuamt Mo.





It would not be too difficult to criticise the disarmament
endeavors of the United states over the past sixteen years* >me
authors who write in this field concentrate tnelr attention in this
direction. This is not only an unreasonable approach, it is also un-
productive. In the same banner that disarmament policy mist be con-
sidered as an integral part of national security policy, disarmament
efforts must be judged relative to world conditions, public attitudes in
the Unite i states, and previous disarmament history* If the United
States disarmament program Is evaluated in a vacuum, it can only be
found a failure.
Until quite recently, disarmament has not been as pressing an
issue in the Uniteu states as in many other countries. This is espe-
cially true of the turopean nations that nave oeen torn apart by two
world wars, ami sea little chance even for survival in a third such
holocaust. In Western Europe, whether vieweu as a panacea or merely a
dim hope for a more rational international oruer, disarmament has been a
foremost subject for political discussion for decades* Perhaps there
was much more encouragement for disarmament in the Europe of a half
century ago, when there were several states of relatively equal power.,
all of which night benefit by proportionate disarmament, assuming that
political agreement could be achieved* If by chance one nation turned
ant to be a loser through the disarmament agreement, there was at least
"room for maneuver*' for the losez to recoup his loss in the international
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:j alliances could be juggled, or new colonies developed, or
the economic base could be strengthened. Today, we have frosen ourselves
into a sterile division of power blocs that permits the least amount of
adjustment.
Th United States only recently has become a powerful world
leader within this arena of limited political maneuvering. In addition,
the United States has not suffered military devastation as has Europe.
For these and other reasons, disarmament as a goal has not been too well
received in governmental—and private—circles in the United States
until recent years. Disarmament has been an unwanted stepchild in the
United states Government; it has not he&i able to claim a "disciple" in
this country of the stature of Noel- Baker in Great Britain or Moch In
France. Disarmament also has not been grasped as a valid political
by either of the American political parties, as compared to the
lis the labor and socialist parties of Western Europe place upon
this issue. This lack of public clamor for some degree of arms limita-
tion has probably been a dominant factor in the failure of the United
States to produce, until quite recently, a corps of disarmament experts
or assemblage of expertise, or a continuity of purpose and expression to
its disarmament philosophy.
The outlook regarding the organisation of the government for
disarmament has beam improving just as the prospects for effective
agreement with the U.S.S.R. appear to be diminishing. Nevertheless, the
attempt to establish a more effective governmental apparatus for devel-
oping disarmament policy must continue, just as the search for successful
and secure disarmament must continue.
i Iw
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The problem Mid the demands involved in this task were lucidly
presented to the Senate In June, 1961, by Senator Humphreyt
Disarmament is not aerely a aatter for diplomats at a nego-
tiating table) it is a subject for scientists and technicians
also. Let that be clear. Disaraaaent that involves modern
weapons will require an intricate system of inspection and
international controls requiring the most sophisticated elec-
tronic, accoustical, magnetic, and other scientific devices.
uisaraaaent brings into full focus the interrelationship and
the interdependency of diplomacy and science. Therefore, our
preparations must be continuous, constant, up to uate, and ever
more reliable* Therefore, disarmament is a demanding task.
Disarmament is full-time work. It cannot be undertaken by half-
hearted, part-time efforts.
.... we must have the finest minds, and we must have
complete and total preparation. I submit that throughout the
years this has not been the case. All too often we have yone to
disaraaaent conferences poorly prepared technically, without an
adequate position of our own or our allies, and uncertain as to
our objectives, and even more uncertain as to the procedures to
be fol lowed.
I
Whether the Arms Control and Disaraaaent Agency answers these
criticisms is a different matter. At least the Agency might present a
much greater opportunity than in the past for the United States to
become an effective leader for international arms control.
The United States has not always stated its disaraaaent position
with clarity, foresight, and consistency. Although the principal thesis
of this paper is that governmental organisation has not always been
conducive to the development of the basic disaraaaent decisions required
for consistent, realistic policy, it must be recognized that no new
^Address to the Senate by Senator Humphrey in introducing the
bill to establish a united states Disaraaaent Agency for World Peace and
security, Congressional I xord , June 29, 1961, 87th Congress, 1st
Session, Vol. CVII, pp. 10BMJ- 108U9.
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organisation by itself is going to produce the desired results. The
collective, governmental attitude combined with strong leadership will
be decisive in future endeavors. It is obvious that much of the world
looks to the government of the United states for increased and sustained
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